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Indicative Abstract: In times of war the private sector adapts, often to function informally, and 
can serve to either perpetuate conflict or to incentivize peace. Accordingly, the private sector is a 
powerful tool that can be utilized during post-conflict reconstruction to enable sustainable peace 
and economic development. After a conflict, in an effort to establish a means of survival outside 
of the war economy, there is a pressing need for the population to have a means by which to 
provide a livelihood and productively contribute to society. Establishing sustainable economic 
exchange and developing social capital between various members of society is one mechanism 
by which to achieve restorative justice and dis-incentivize conflict.  
Building upon an evaluation of the literature and practice of post-conflict economic 
development, this paper argues for a hybrid approach to private sector development that includes 
both the investment climate and interventionist methods to dis-incentivize a return to conflict. 
Defining private sector development as the set of activities undertaken to promote growth and 
reduce poverty by developing a market-oriented private sector, this addresses “the twin goals of 
economic growth and peace … to strengthen conditions for the growth of a stable, accessible, 
and competitive private sector and to contribute to a lasting and durable peace”.1 
Analysis of the war economy and the costs of conflict build a foundation for an 
exploration of economic reconstruction and the need to provide economic incentives for peace. 
Conflict is not irrational and participants, whether civilian or combatants, must balance 
incentives, opportunities, and feasibility calculations to determine their participation in and 
reaction to conflict. Economic activity can incentivize, drive, prolong, or bring an end to 
violence; accordingly, it is imperative that those engaged in private sector development in post-
conflict countries understand and acknowledge the importance of conflict-sensitive economic 
development to promote durable peace. To demonstrate these principles, this paper conducts a 
review of the evolution of international paradigms of economic development. Highlighting the 
failure of previous policies in addressing underlying causes of war, this paper heavily 
emphasizes the importance of governance and coordination among actors to prevent a relapse in 
violence. Citing examples from sub-Saharan Africa, this paper analyzes the paradigm shifts in 
approach to economic development and the implications of their respective implementation in 
post-conflict developing countries.  
                                                 
1 Bagwitz, Daniel; Becker, Sabine; Elges, Reinhold; Goretzky, Wulf; Hofmann, Armin; Hilal, Tarig; Krech, Robert; Kruk, Gabriele (2008): 
Economic Development in Conflict- Affected Countries: A Practitioner’s Note. Eschborn, Ger: FIAS. Washington DC: GTZ. www.enterprise-
development.org/download.aspx?id=1283. 
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Introduction 
 
Overview 
In 2000, the World Bank released “Can Africa Claim the 21st Century?” in which it 
outlined four steps for sub-Saharan African countries to realize their potential: (1) invest in 
people (education, health, skill training, gender equality); (2) improve governance and resolve 
conflict (address poverty-conflict cycle of underdevelopment, marginalization, and lack of 
economic diversification); (3) increase competitiveness (encourage investment by mitigating risk 
and uncertainty, integration and diversification of the economy); and (4) reduce dependency on 
aid.
2
 These generic, four steps are necessary for growth in most developing countries; however, 
in sub-Saharan Africa the highlighted role of conflict in hindering the growth process is notable. 
It is apparent that “economic, social, and institutional change is possible” in the African context, 
but many countries “still face substantial governance and economic constraints to growth” 
heavily influenced by their post-conflict contextual realities.
3
  
Ending conflict, achieving political stability, and improving governance are foundational 
requirements for improved macroeconomic policies enabling economic growth. African 
countries must continue to re-energize markets by improving the investment climate (decreasing 
inflation, foreign debt, and budget deficit; stabilizing exchange rates; reducing trade barriers; 
cutting corporate taxes; and privatizing enterprise) to encourage business. Furthermore, 
enhancing regional and international, as well as public, private, and local integration and 
investment, will enable more African countries to reach economies of scale and become 
competitive leading to sustainable economic growth in the future. Increasing demand and prices 
for natural resources, while providing much needed growth, will not sustain Africa without good 
governance, investment in human capital, and continued diversification into other sectors as seen 
in the last decade. 
If war is a continuation of economics by other means,
4
 this thesis argues that proper 
development of post-conflict economies, specifically the private sector, may assist mitigation of 
incentives for war and enable durable peace while promoting economic growth. Post- conflict 
                                                 
2 Gelb, Alan; Ali, Ali AG; Dinka, Tesfaye; Elbadawi, Ibrahim; Fosu, Augustin; Mlambo, Kupukile (2000): Can Africa Claim the 21st 
Century?. Washington, DC: The World Bank. 
3 Kaufmann, Daniel (2011): On Africa’s New Dawn: From Premature Exuberance to Tempered Optimism. Washington DC: Brookings 
Institute. http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0607_africa_new_dawn_kaufmann.aspx 
4 Keen, David (1998): The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars. Oxford: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for 
Strategic Studies. 
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reconstruction literature and practice widely acknowledge the importance of economics during 
times of both peace and war. An emphasis on negative economic aspects of conflict includes the 
greed vs. grievance debate, the power of war economies, and the role of a predatory private 
sector. In light of this, recent research and practice highlight economic incentives for peace and 
the positive impact of private sector development on transitioning societies.  
Post-conflict ‘private sector development’ (PSD) is defined as the set of activities 
undertaken to promote growth and reduce poverty by developing a “productive, sustainable, and 
market-oriented private sector.”5 This strategy addresses “the twin goals of economic growth and 
peace, in other words, to strengthen conditions for the growth of a stable, accessible, and 
competitive private sector and to contribute to a lasting and durable peace.”6 In times of war, the 
private sector adapts, often to function informally, and can serve to either perpetuate conflict or 
to incentivize peace. Accordingly, the private sector should be utilized during post-conflict 
reconstruction to enable sustainable peace and development.  
This paper seeks to explore the paradigm shifts
7
 in approach to economic development 
and the implications of their implementation in post-conflict developing countries. By critically 
evaluating the literature and practice of economic development in post-independent sub-Saharan 
Africa, this paper argues in support of the private sector development framework’s hybrid 
approach of investment climate reform and interventionist strategies, as outlined by the Donor 
Committee for Enterprise Development (DCED). During the restoration phase of post-conflict 
reconstruction there is a “need to balance demands for greater economic growth with those for 
greater social justice and human welfare. A series of changes and promises to deal with 
grievances are likely to have been agreed to and underpin any peace deal; to ignore these and to 
impose generic policies for economic growth…may have high short run costs [and] may well 
simply lead to a reigniting of hostilities.”8 
Fortunately, the PSD approach is conflict-sensitive, allowing for simultaneous pursuit of 
short and long-term goals, engagement of the public sector promoting governance and stability, 
and allowing integration with other post-conflict recovery work including humanitarian relief, 
                                                 
5 Sweeney, Naoise Mac (2008): Private Sector Development in Post-Conflict Countries: A Review of Current Literature and Practice. 
Cambridge: Donor Committee for Enterprise Development (DCED). 
6 Bagwitz, Daniel; Becker, Sabine; Elges, Reinhold; Goretzky, Wulf; Hofmann, Armin; Hilal, Tarig; Krech, Robert; Kruk, Gabriele (2008): 
Economic Development in Conflict- Affected Countries: A Practitioner’s Note. Eschborn, Ger: FIAS. Washington DC: GTZ. www.enterprise-
development.org/download.aspx?id=1283. 
7 The paradigm shifts in the Bretton Woods Institutions’ approach refers to structural adjustment under the Washington Consensus, poverty 
reduction strategies, and the current private sector development framework.   
8 Dunne, John Paul (1996): Post-conflict Mozambique and Rwanda compared. The Economics of Peace and Security Journal, 1(2):39-46. 
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security sector reform, and socio-economic development. However, in spite of economic growth 
and a sustained peace, examples from Mozambique highlight two major failures of the paradigm: 
(1) aid dependency and (2) distributive issues. The final chapter of this paper will address 
implementation challenges and the importance of appropriately sequencing PSD and 
coordinating actors to address socio-economic challenges.  
Analytical Approach 
This paper is a qualitative survey of both the literature and practice of post-conflict 
private sector development (PSD). Accordingly, the relevant research will utilize both primary 
and secondary sources, building on knowledge of economists, academics, and development 
practitioners concerning general trends and the evolution of post-conflict economic 
reconstruction to develop the private sector. After providing a descriptive, fundamental 
understanding of the economic impact of conflict on a society, this paper will analyze the 
evolution of economic development paradigms in sub-Saharan countries with an emphasis on 
post-conflict states.  
Post-conflict private sector development, and broader economic reconstruction, must be 
distinguished from general best practices for development. The objectives of post-conflict private 
sector development include sustainable peace and economic growth; in this context, traditional 
indicators and practices for economic development must be adjusted accordingly.  Historically, 
the international paradigms have focused on “technical solutions to private sector development 
such as better roads, more power generation, and reduction of the regulatory burden”; but this 
does not adequately address grievances and incentives for conflict or government capacity to 
prevent relapse to violence.
9
 
In the 1990s, the Bretton Woods Institutions, donor countries, and development 
organizations failed to acknowledge the significance of conflict-context-specific policies “as if 
war-torn countries could isolate their economic programs from the political and security realities 
of the aftermath of war.”10 Fortunately, the failure of isolated macroeconomic stabilization 
programming led to a paradigm shift that incorporated human security and good governance into 
poverty reduction economic development and reconstruction strategies. While these policies 
                                                 
9 Eifert, Benn; Gelb, Alan; Ramachandran, Vijaya (2005): Business Environment and Comparative Advantage in Africa: Evidence from the 
Investment Climate Data. ICA Paper. World Bank. 
10 del Castillo, Graciana (2011): The Economics of Peace: 5 Rules for Effective Reconstruction. Washington, DC: United States Institute of 
Peace, Special Report 286. 
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have been met with some success, recent literature calls for greater public sector engagement in 
the development of the private sector for sustained growth and peace in post-conflict countries.  
The PSD paradigm of the early 2000s was one in which “the poor relied on [small 
enterprises] for their livelihoods” and because “these businesses were disadvantaged…that 
justified subsidizing their access to knowledge and finance” leading to aid dependency and a lack 
of incentives for institutional and policy change.
11
 While focusing on facilitating a better 
livelihood for the poor, such approaches are still insufficient for private sector development 
promotion of peace in post-conflict countries. Accordingly, while the current private sector 
development framework successfully addressees many of the flawed policies of the 1960s - 
1990s, it still falls short of effectively establishing a mature private sector; instead, countries face 
high aid dependency and distributive issues.  These problems have negative implications for the 
development of public sector capacity and legitimacy, entrepreneur activity, and private sector 
production of goods and services. 
Utilizing brief, illustrative examples from Mozambique, this paper will first assess the 
International Financial Institutions’ private sector ‘solutions’ to growth from the 1960s - early 
1990s and the reality of their failure to acknowledge the implications of on-going conflict across 
sub-Saharan Africa. This period will be contrasted with the late 1990s post-structural adjustment 
policies of poverty reduction that acknowledged the importance of governance and building 
capacity of the post-conflict public sector. The later begins to address the causes of conflict and 
escalating factors that incentivized violence. A shift in focus to supporting economic actors in 
crisis prevention, conflict transformation, and peace building represents strategic lines of 
intervention for the private sector.
12
 While rapid growth during this period has received praise, 
the significance of impact is misleading as illustrated by two different perspectives of 
Mozambique:  
One is of rapid GDP growth and growing exports and of transparent and clear 
management of donor money. The other is of worsening poverty in rural areas and of 
state capture, with predatory elite that robs banks and non-donor resources, smuggles and 
kills, and maintains a corrupt justice system. A symbiotic relationship has grown up 
between the Mozambican predatory elite and the donors to maintain the myth of the 
Mozambican success story.
13
  
 
                                                 
11 OECD (2004): Accelerating Pro-Poor Growth Through Support for Private Sector Development, 57. 
12 Bagwitz et al. (2008) 
13 Hanlon (2004: 760) as quoted in Bertelsen, Bjorn Enge (2005): War, Peace, and Development in Mozambique: A Critical Assessment. 
(Presented Workshop Paper). Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute, 66. 
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For the purposes of this paper, conflict—the antithesis of development—will include both 
intra and interstate conflict with Mozambique serving as a clear example of the devastation of 
intrastate conflict in sub-Saharan Africa.
14
 Post-conflict reconstruction and recovery will be used 
interchangeable to signify “the long-term rebuilding of a society in the aftermath of violent 
conflict” including “political, socioeconomic, and physical aspects such as disarming and 
reintegrating combatants, resettling internally displaced persons, reforming governmental 
institutions, promoting trauma work and reconciliation, delivering justice, restarting the 
economy, and rebuilding damaged infrastructure,” among other activities.15 It is not only the 
physical violence or “more obvious destruction of capital that [comes] out of the conflict but 
[also] the less visible damage to institutions, markets, and confidence, [as well as] the persistence 
of subsistence agriculture for the majority of the population” that plagues a country for years to 
come as demonstrated by the civil war in Mozambique.
16
  
Building upon an evaluation of the contextual realities of post-conflict countries and the 
international paradigms for economic development, this paper argues for: (1) a hybrid approach 
to PSD that includes both the investment climate and interventionist frameworks to disincentive 
a return to conflict; (2) private sector development that facilitates the building of public sector 
capacity and legitimacy; and (3) a discussion of aid dependency and the importance of an 
integrated reconstruction strategy that enables capacity building and greater coordination of 
stakeholders.  
Limitations 
In explaining social, political, and economic consequences of conflict, this paper will 
highlight general trends with the understanding that each case is different and that private sector 
development must be conflict sensitive and situation specific.  Furthermore, it is beyond the 
scope of this paper to adequately address the wealth of literature concerning all causes of conflict 
and post-conflict reconstruction; therefore, this analysis will focus on the field of private sector 
development while acknowledging the importance of its integration with humanitarian relief, 
rule of law, security sector reform, human development, and transitional justice for sustainable 
peacebuilding and development. As it concerns examples from Mozambique, this paper will 
reference, but not significantly analyze, the implications of environmental or health factors and 
                                                 
14Collier, Paul (2003): Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press & Washington, DC: 
The World Bank. 
15 USIP Glossary of Terms. “Post-Conflict Recovery.” (2012) http://glossary.usip.org/resource/post-conflict-recovery 
16 Dunne, Paul (2006): After the Slaughter: Reconstructing Mozambique and Rwanda. Economics of Peace and Security Journal 1(2):39-46. 
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their contributions to the Mozambican economy; this includes the droughts and famines of the 
1990s as well as the HIV / AIDs crisis. Lastly, it should be noted that this paper addresses the 
high level paradigm of economic development and their implementations; it will not extrapolate 
to including monitoring and evaluating of specific programming.  
This paper will not address the dynamics of conflict intervention, negotiation / mediation, 
and resolution; neither is the argument differentiating peacekeeping, peacemaking, and 
peacebuilding relevant. For the purposes of this paper, peacebuilding is one critical aspect of 
post-conflict reconstruction. Economic development plays a significant role in disincentivizing a 
return to violence and therefore assists in facilitation of this endeavor. Academics and 
development practitioners often differentiate between the stages of conflict and reconstruction in 
regards to which interventions are appropriate at given time periods; the author of this paper 
acknowledges the importance of this consideration without recommending one best practice 
approach.   
Chapter One: Economics and Conflict  
 
The study of conflict and conflict prevention is interdisciplinary in nature. Today’s 
prevalence of intrastate conflict has numerous social, political, and economic triggers (i.e. “the 
attainment of political independence or statehood, regime change, and military coups; elections; 
neighboring conflicts; and other dramatic events”) as well as various risk factors (i.e. “presence 
of natural resources; low income; low economic growth; ethnic [or religious] antagonisms; 
neighborhood effects and external instigation of armed conflict; geography and large 
populations; a youth bulge, especially proportionally very large numbers of men between 15 to 
29 years of age; political repression and corruption; competition for scarce resources; inequality; 
religious extremism; flawed or incomplete transition to democracy; high military expenditure 
and large armies; diasporas; colonialism and superpower rivalries; and the existence of previous 
conflicts).”17 Although this study will not focus on social and political drivers, it is important to 
acknowledge that economic factors do not operation in isolation; for example, economy activity 
requires state provision of security, governance, and legal frameworks for protection of 
economic exchange or property rights.
18
  
                                                 
17Brauer, Jurgen and Dunne, Paul (2010): Chapter 13: Macroeconomics and Violence, in: Braddon, D. and Hartley, K. (eds.), Handbook on the 
Economics of Conflict. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
18 This author acknowledges the limitations of a sole focus on economic drivers of war and the potential of flaw use of proxies and data 
limitations in the quantitative studies discussed in this chapter. 
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Economics play three different roles as it concerns conflict: (1) grievances before war, (2) 
funding / provision of resources during war, and (3) production and exchange mechanisms after 
war and during reconstruction.
19
  In addressing the economic drivers and effects of conflict, this 
chapter will discuss the evolution in understanding the role of economics and conflict through 
the greed verse grievance debates, resource competition, war economies, the rise of the informal 
sector, distortions of capital and labor, and both immediate and legacy cost of conflict. This 
analysis will dispel the myth that markets and the private sector fail to operate during times of 
conflict; instead, they adapt but face heavy costs and risks in an insecure environment. An 
understanding of the economic drivers and effects of conflict highlights opportunities for public 
sector policies and private sector solutions as “economic policies implemented during a war will 
determine the size and nature of the country’s long-term peace dividend”.20 By deconstructing 
the cost of conflict, this chapter will lay the foundation for a discussion of the economic 
incentives for peace and post-conflict reconstruction in ensuing chapters.  
 
Economic Drivers of Conflict 
 
In both World Wars, and even during the Cold War, the major actors in violent conflict 
were States with set rules of engagement and specific agendas. Governments had complete 
sovereignty with little international pressure concerning what took place within a country’s 
borders, and warring parties acknowledged the distinction between civilians and soldiers. 
Furthermore, wars were fought to win; they ended in clear victory with agreements to dictate a 
return to peace. In the post-Cold War era, developing countries lost significant foreign aid, which 
negatively impacted their ability to use resources for service provision, patronage, or even to pay 
militaries. For some, war became a profession, an opportunity for looting, and a form of 
enterprise creating conditions of durable conflict allowing fighting in perpetuity. Accordingly, 
the 1990s witnessed the rise of civil wars and armed conflicts that brought about complex 
emergencies, loss of distinction between civilians and insurgents, increased arms, horrific 
atrocities including genocide, and a political war economy. These new wars have three major 
cyclical indicators: (1) the greatest predictor of this type of war is a previous war as 50% of civil 
wars will revert back to armed conflict within 5 years; (2) while conflict is development in 
                                                 
19 Brauer, Jurgen and Dunne, Paul (2010) 
20 Brück, Tilman (1997): Macroeconomic Effects of the War in Mozambique. (Working paper number 11.) Oxford: Queen Elizabeth House, 
University of Oxford. 
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reverse, poverty and underdevelopment increase a country’s propensity to wage war; and (3) 
insecurity breeds violence, and negotiated peace arrangements that fail to bring security to 
citizens create a state of “not war, not peace”.21  
The rise in the number of civil wars has numerous context-specific political, social, and 
economic drivers that can be divided into four categories: (1) causes that fuel incentives or 
motives for participating in violence; (2) causes that facilitate the mobilization and expansion of 
violence; (3) causes found at the level of state capacity to manage and respond to violence; and 
(4) causes of a regional or international nature.
22
 While drivers of conflict are not direct causal 
mechanisms, the presence of various factors within a country increases the likelihood and risk of 
conflict requiring that public, private, and civil society actors appropriately address such 
incentives and means by which others seize opportunities for conflict.  
In analyzing economic causes of civil wars, Collier & Hoeffer conducted a quantitative 
study to explore the impact of per capita income and natural resources (proxies for taxable base), 
population size, and ethno-linguistic fractionalization on the occurrence and duration of conflict. 
They found that conflict occurs when incentives outweigh cost, making it a rational decision.
23 
These conclusions are supported by the finding that high per capita income decreases the 
duration and probability of conflict, supporting the idea that poorly developed and low-income 
countries are more likely to engage in intrastate conflict. In making the decision to undertake 
conflict, rebel groups must consider numerous opportunity cost including the disruption of 
existing economic activity and the cost of fighting labor; accordingly, expected duration of 
conflict and the probability of conflict decreases for those countries with higher incomes per 
capita (i.e. higher opportunity cost). Additionally, the probability of rebellion decreases as the 
taxable base increases—the rationale being that increases in government revenue allow for an 
increase in military spending and the provision of security by the government, making the cost of 
conflict higher for rebels.  
Collier & Hoeffler corrected their 1994 theory that rebel movements incur net costs 
during conflict, and instead they juxtaposed the opportunities for rebellion against the 
constraints, generating the infamous greed and grievance theory.
24
  In analyzing greed (financing 
                                                 
21 Collier, Paul (2003) 
22 USAID (2004): Conducting a Conflict Assessment: A Framework for Strategy and Program Development. Washington, DC: USAID, 3. 
23 Grossman (1995) and Hirschleifer (1995) are economic theories that consider war a rationale choice; Grossman, H. I. (1995): Chapter 8: 
Insurrections, in: Hartley, K. and Sandler, T. (eds.), Handbook of Defense Economics, 1(1):191-212. Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
24 Collier, Paul; Hoeffler, Anke (2004): Greed and Grievance in Civil War. Oxford Economic Papers, 56(4): 563-595. 
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of a rebellion) and grievance (ethnic and religious divisions), the authors found that the 
economic drivers of greed theory have more explanatory power of incidence of civil war. 
Rebellion financing includes (1) extortion of primary commodity exports / natural resources, (2) 
diasporas’ donations, and (3) subvention from other governments.25, 26 In understanding causes of 
conflict as functions of preference, opportunities, and perceptions,
27
 Collier & Hoeffler use per 
capita GDP, growth, social fractionalization, the ratio of primary commodity exports / GDP, and 
population size as proxies for opportunity. 
Research shows that the incidence and opportunity for conflict is influenced by 
availability of finance (discussed previously), cost of rebellion (education, per capita income, 
growth rate, etc.), and military advantage. The ability of rebels or governments to finance 
conflict may also be related to availability of natural resources.
28 
The impact of natural resources 
on conflict incidence and duration is non-monotonic; at high levels, the presence of natural 
resources can increase the financial capacity of the government to increase military expenditures 
and provide security, preventing conflict.
29
 On the contrary, the initial presence of resources may 
increase the incidence and duration of conflict serving as both an incentive and means for 
waging war. To unpack this further, primary commodity exports increase the risk of conflict in 
two ways: (1) if extorted, they help fund rebellion and (2) resource dependence may negatively 
impact governance, enhancing grievances among the population and incentivizing rebellion.
30
 
Additionally, provision of finance for rebellion by the diaspora increases the risk of conflict. 
Opportunity costs for violence are defined as “proxying earnings foregone in rebellion.”31 In 
concluding that greed motivates conflict, as explained with opportunity indicators, Collier & 
Hoeffler qualify that rebels are not “necessarily criminals, but the grievances that motivate rebels 
may be substantially disconnected from the larger social concerns of inequality, political rights, 
and ethnic or religious identity”.32 
                                                 
25 There is a wealth of literature on hostile governments funding rebel groups as well as the role of external military intervention and its impact 
on the duration of conflict (see Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000). 
26 Collier, Paul; Hoeffler, Anke (2004) 
27 Hirschleifer, J (1995): Chapter 7: Theorizing about conflict, in: Hartley, K. and Sandler, T. (eds.), Handbook of Defense Economics, 
1(1):165-192. Amsterdam: Elsevier.  
28 Exploitation and confiscation of the population’s economic assets whether through taxation or looting also finance conflict as depicted in 
Kalyvas, Stathis N (2001): New and old civil wars: a valid distinction? World Politics, 54(1):99-118. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
This explores the control of civilians by insurgents and governments and the impact on conflict duration; this is related to civilian 
victimization, waging of war, and rebel recruitment. 
29 Collier, Paul; Hoeffler, Anke (1998): On Economic Causes of Civil War. Oxford Economic Papers, 50(4): 563-573. 
30 Collier, Paul; Hoeffler, Anke (2004) 
31 Collier, Paul; Hoeffler, Anke (2004) 
32 Collier, Paul; Hoeffler, Anke (2004) 
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In the 2009 study, “Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility and Civil War,” Collier & 
Hoeffler
33
 address the financial and strategic feasibility of rebel groups engaging government 
forces in a civil war. While their previous worked focused on motivation for rebellion, this paper 
highlights basic feasibility. Building upon the Machiavelli Theorem that no profitable 
opportunities for violence will go unused,
 the authors suggest a feasibility hypothesis “that where 
a rebellion is financially and militarily feasible it will occur.”34 In confirming results from their 
1998 and 2004 studies, the authors find that the level, growth, and structure of income are 
significant. In 2009, Collier & Hoeffler put forth three channels through which the ‘structure’ of 
income, inclusive of primary commodities, relates to increased risk of conflict. The three 
channels of financing rebellion include: (1) preying on the population, (2) capturing commodity 
rents, and (3) capitalizing on the fact that resource-rich countries are less accountable to their 
populations, allowing exposure of the people’s grievances.35 
There is much consensus on the role of per capita income in influencing the risk of 
conflict, but this indicator has been utilized differently by political scientists Fearon and Laitin 
and economists Collier & Hoeffler. As opposed to viewing per capita income as a measure of 
opportunity cost for rebellion like the economists, Fearon and Laitin use income as a proxy for 
effectiveness of the state and ability of government to deter rebellions. This leads them to 
conclude that a financially, bureaucratically, and militarily weak government increases the risk 
of civil war.
36
 In support of Collier and Hoeffler’s research, Fearon and Laitin find poverty, 
political instability, rough terrain, and large populations to best explain countries at risk for civil 
war. While they support the idea that financial potential for rebels is a driver of conflict, Fearon 
and Laitin critique Collier and Hoeffler’s idea that primary commodity exports are an accurate 
proxy of financing potential for rebels; they believe that this variable encompasses oil, 
agricultural products, metals, and minerals which may be hard to exploit without robust 
infrastructure and distribution systems. They argue that a better measure would be that of 
“presence of minerals or contraband that can reward control of a small enclave with huge 
profits.”37 In summary, Fearon and Laitin find that “state weakness marked by poverty, a large 
                                                 
33 In this study the authors identify three non-economic indicators that are statistically significant and support the feasibility hypothesis: the 
French security umbrella, the proportion of young men in the population, and the proportion of the terrain which is mountainous.  
Collier, Paul; Hoeffler, Anke; Rohner, Dominic (2009): Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility and Civil War. Oxford Economic Papers, 
61(1):21-22 
34 Collier, Paul; Hoeffler, Anke; Rohner, Dominic (2009) 
35 Collier, Paul; Hoeffler, Anke; Rohner, Dominic (2009) 
36 Fearon, James; Laitin, David (2003): Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War. The American Political Science Review, 97(1):88. 
37 Fearon, James; Laitin, David (2003) 
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population, and instability – are better predictors of countries at risk for civil war than indicators 
of ethnic and religious diversity or measures of grievance such as economic inequality, lack of 
democracy or civil liberties, or state discrimination against minority religions or languages.”38, 39 
Sambanis reviews the quantitative literature on civil war utilizing economic theory, 
political rational choice theory, international relations theory, and constructivist theory. In 
addressing the discrepancies concerning the coding of civil wars and the limitations of current 
literature, there are four major points of consensus: “first, poverty exacerbates the risk of civil 
violence; second, ethnic diversity need not increase the risk of civil violence and may actually 
decrease it; third, excessive dependence on easily lootable natural resources increases the risk of 
conflict; [and] fourth, mountainous or heavily forested terrain facilitates insurgency.”40 Blatman 
and Manuel summarizes that “civil war is more likely to occur in countries that are poor, are 
subject to negative income shocks, have weak state institutions, have sparsely populated 
peripheral regions, and possess mountainous terrain.”41  However, they acknowledge that 
research still fails to distinguish between which drivers cause war and which are symptomatic of 
other systemic problems. The aforementioned quantitative studies have been complimented by 
qualitative, case study literature focused on the linkages between drivers and conflict incidence. 
It is important to remain mindful that some indicators contribute to both incidence and duration. 
An understanding of economic variables that influence either or both the onset and duration of 
war is important for prevention and monitoring mechanisms; additionally, it is also relevant to 
analysis and critical engagement of the functioning of war economies to identify ways to 
incentivize an end to conflict.  
 
War Economies  
 
The ability to sustain conflict requires financial resources; accordingly, the continual 
struggle for income to sustain fighting has often lead to the exploitation of resources, whether 
commodities or human capital. While countries in conflict face significant economic costs and 
                                                 
38 Fearon, James; Laitin, David (2003) 
39 It must be noted that the economic explanations of civil war onset are not without their critics. Other scholars critique the flawed use of 
proxies and the conclusion that motives for violent behavior can all be categorized as greed. For example, economic inequality and power 
struggles (grievances) may also motivate violent action (Herbst 2000 and Kalyvas 2001).  
Herbst, J (2000): Economic, political, and social incentives in the organization of rebellion in Africa. Paper prepared for the World Bank 
conference on “The Economics of Political Violence.” Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 18–19 March 2000.  
Kalyvas, Stathis N (2002) 
40 Sambanis, Nicholas (2010): A Review of Recent Advances and Future Directions in the Quantitative Literature on Civil War. Defense and 
Peace Economics, 13(3):215-243. 
41 Blatman, Christopher; Miguel, Edward (2010): Civil War. Journal of Economic Literature, 48(1):22. 
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distortions to market operations, economic exchange continues to occur. War economies are “the 
cluster of economic activities that feed into and flow out of conflict, requir[ing] an extremely 
high level of instability to function and hav[ing] a corrosive effect on state institutions.”42 The 
previous section addressed the variables that increase the risk of conflict, many of which also 
impact the duration of conflict and the persistence of the war economy as illustrated by the 
incentives for war.  
During war, there are three economies in operation: exchange, grants, and appropriations. 
The first addresses the trade of goods and services that may be interrupted during conflict due to 
insecurity and destruction of trade relations and infrastructure. Grants include transfer of 
resources such as foreign aid that may be exploited by either side of the conflict as seen with 
food aid to Somalia in the 1990s.
 
In this manner, aid can be detrimental and utilized by warlords 
to exploit the population, or aid can negatively impact market structures leading to anomalies. 
Appropriations concerns the involuntary taking of economic resources, inclusive of both taxation 
and robbery; “the salience of appropriates economies lies in the need to establish a credible and 
enforceable social contract within, between, and among communities and societies.”43 This last 
type of ‘war economy’ alludes to the role of crime resulting from insecurity during periods of 
war.  
The presence of resources may impact the onset and duration of conflict by financing 
violence (i.e. the presence of oil and diamonds in Angola); however, resources controlled by the 
state can also dis-incentivize conflict by generating revenue for military spending and security 
provision.
44
 Le Billion discusses the ‘resource defense dilemma’ where separate groups increase 
their defense capacity in an effort to secure resources as seen with various actors operating in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo. Similar to the security dilemma, these actions are viewed as 
threats to other actors and raise the stakes for conflict. In the presence of state collapse, 
combatants resort to violence as “the prim[ary] means of political action, economic 
accumulation, or simply survival” which may be provided from resource rents.45 In addition to 
resources financing conflict, commodities or natural resources upon which a state is heavily 
                                                 
42 USAID (2004) 
43 Brauer, Jurgen and Dunne, Paul (2010) 
44 Collier, Paul and Hoeffler, Anke (2001): Data Issues in the Study of Conflict. Paper prepared for the conference on “Data Collection on 
Armed Conflict.” Uppsala, Sweden, 8-9 June 2001. 
45 Le Billion, Phillipe (2001) 
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dependent may initially impact the incidence of state failure, as exemplified by the decline in 
coffee exports in Rwanda prior to the 1994 genocide.
46 
 
In conflict, the state may control core areas and key economic zones but not the 
hinterland due to economic rationalization; in these environments, there is little incentive and 
great cost to consolidate power and provide security. This insecurity coupled with declining 
production and the need for resources influences a loss in assets and human resources “due to the 
importance of force and coercion during conflict, which often means that economic assets are 
forcibly taken control of by conflict actors, and some economic sectors are ‘captured’ by factions 
or interest groups. Informality of the economy is both favorable to, and partly created by, the 
predatory private sector.”47 Accordingly, businesses and individuals must develop ‘coping 
strategies’ given the distortion of normal commercial patterns and the decline in both production 
and consumption.
48 
The rise of the informal economy in regards to black markets, trafficking 
(humans, drugs, or arms), resource exploitation, entrepreneurial activity that promotes horizontal 
inequalities, and sanctions-busting activities is widespread and may often be necessary for 
survival.  
Duffield
49
 acknowledges the importance of recognizing the operations of the informal 
sector during and after conflict; this provides both a means of livelihood for many and can foster 
criminal and destructive behavior for others. Given a lack of regulations and standardized 
systems of procedure during conflict, private sector activities may be irregular and opportunistic 
with decreases in the scale of economic activity being partially responsible for informality.
50
 The 
informal economy is characterized by underreported employment, tax evasion, and significant 
lack of regulations. Informality is on the rise in many countries, especially those that are labor-
intensive, as a result of higher tax burdens and cuts in government enforcement budgets. The 
decision for economic actors to engage informality is dependent upon (1) limited enforcement of 
legal obligations, (2) cost of operating formally, and (3) social norms.
51
 Government corruption 
and inability to devote resources to regulate the economy, in both conflict and post-conflict 
environments, may incentivize the rise of this means of economics. The short-term benefits of 
                                                 
46 Le Billion, Phillipe (2001) 
47  Sweeney, Naoise Mac (2008): 21. 
48 Bray, John (2007): The Role of Private Sector Development in Post-Conflict Economic Recovery. UNDP Report. 
49 Duffield, Mark (1998): Post Modern Conflict: Warlords, Post-Adjustment States and Private Protection. Journal of Civil Wars, 1(1):65-102. 
Duffield, Mark. Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security. London, Zed Books, 2001. 
50 Sweeney, Naoise Mac (2008) 21. 
51 Farrell, Diana (2004): Hidden Dangers of the Informal Economy. McKinsey Quarterly. McKinsey and Company. 
https://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/The_hidden_dangers_of_the_informal_economy_1448 
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informality include a rise in economic productivity, growth, and employment as well as potential 
alleviation of socio-economic unemployment issues that are not addressed during conflict. 
However, long-term implications include distortion of competition, limited productivity, and 
overall economic inefficiency. The damaging effects on productivity and economic growth are 
witnessed as the informal economy takes market shares from bigger, formal companies as others 
avoid taxes and regulations promoting grievances and dis-incentivizing compliance with legal 
policy. These actions undercut more productive companies that would normally take a larger 
share of the market. Accordingly, the rise of informality discourages investments, new 
technology, and best practices operating methods.
52
 
Poor regulation and insecurity enable looting during war; however, Menkhaus discusses 
the interest of non-state actor during protracted conflict in which ‘warlords’ may become 
‘landlords.’ Building upon Charles Tilly’s work in Europe, Menkhaus states that “warlords 
accumulat[e] wealth by plunder to a point where their interests shift towards systems of 
protecting rather than looting property” even “at the lowest ranks of gunmen as well as the 
wealthiest merchants,” thus impacting the functionality of the war economy.53 The actual waging 
of war has economic considerations specifically as it concerns the decision to participate in 
violence and to engage in civilian victimization.
54
 Downes explains that governments fighting 
guerilla insurgencies use civilian victimization for two reasons: (1) to dis-incentivize the people 
from supporting the rebellion and / or (2) to remove the population, making it impossible for 
them to help insurgents.
55
 Accordingly, the type of resistance or violence employed then factors 
into “the cost and difficulty of achieving military victory.”56 In this manner, violence alters the 
cost-benefit calculations of civilians as well as that of combatants. The challenging balance for 
combatants is that “a group’s abusiveness may destroy the human and physical base of the local 
economy on which armed groups often depend”; however, “too much violence might lead 
civilians to flee, undermining a group’s ability to obtain the support it needs to survive.”57 The 
case study of Sierra Leone illustrates that individuals have the agency to rationally assess their 
                                                 
52 Farrell, Diana (2004) 
53 Menkhaus, Kenneth (2003): From Warlord to Landlords: Non-State Actors and Humanitarian Norms in Somalia. Draft as provided by 
author, 3. 
54 Kalyvas, Stathis N (2001) 
55 Downes, Alexander (2008): Targeting Civilians in War. Cornell, NY: Cornell University Press. As provided by the UCT Course Reader, 
176. 
56 Downes, Alexander (2008):  
57 Humphreys, Macartan and Weinstein, Jeremy (2006): Handling and Manhandling Civilians in a Civil War. American Political Science 
Review, 100(3):429-447. 
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socio-economic position (wealth) and the opportunity cost (i.e. education) of joining the rebel 
group RUF.
58
 These and other
59
 micro-economic foundations of an individual’s behavior in war 
further support Collier and Hoeffler’s macroeconomic conclusions of the relevance of greed and 
feasibility to the onset and duration of conflict. 
 
Cost of Conflict  
The most apparent negative effect of war is the human 
cost in loss of life; however, post-WWII intrastate wars 
are relatively small and have less than 1,000 battle 
deaths. Nonetheless, they face heavy economic cost.
60
 
Collier estimates that countries experience a 2.2% 
annual loss of GDP per year of conflict.
61
 While some 
costs of conflict may be measured in the short term 
using accounting methods, it is understood that there are 
long-term effects as seen with a counterfactual measurement approach (Figure 1.1
62
). Direct 
estimates include human cost (in regards to deaths 
and causalities), displacement (refugees or IDPs), 
military expenditures (of governments and rebel 
groups), loss of assets (capital destruction), 
production loss (of GDP and income), reduction in 
trade, and indirect costs encompassing inequality, 
human capital effects, and spill-over.  
Before discussing the negative cost of 
conflict, it is important to acknowledge the 
‘positives’ as illustrated by the theory of primitive accumulation63 in which war is simply a part 
of the economic development process. This is similar to the idea of creative destruction and 
                                                 
58 This paper acknowledges that societal pressures and vulnerability to coercion also influence an individual’s decision to join the RUF. 
Humphreys, Macartan and Weinstein, Jeremy (2008): Who Fights? The Determinants of Participation in Civil War. American Journal of 
Political Science, 52(2):436–455. 
59 Gates, S (2002): The Microfoundations of Rebellion. Journal of Conflict Resolution. 46(1):111-130. Oslo: PRIO & Michigan State 
University. 
60 Cost due to health, environment, displacement, or legacy cost are higher 
61 Collier, Paul (1999): On the Economic Consequences of War. Oxford Economic Paper, 51(1):168-183.  
62 Figures 1.1 and 1.2 cited from Dunne Lecture 6: UCT Course, Economics of Conflict, War, and Peace. 
63 Not cited but for more information see Giustozzi, Antonio (2011). The Art of Coercion: The Primitive Accumulation and Management of 
Coercive Power. New York: Columbia UP, 2011 
Figure 1.2 Range of Battle-Related Deaths 
Figure 1.1 Counterfactual Cost of Conflict 
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modernization theory that war may be necessary in order to achieve the right conditions for 
future progress. Accordingly, wars establish new systems of power and profit in addition to new 
opportunities. While war itself may have negative implications, military spending has a 
multiplier effect and it can increase demand, enhance production, and stimulate an economy as 
seen with the United States and World War II following the Great Depression.
64
 
The cost of conflict can be divided into four categories accordingly to Paul Dunne: short 
and medium term effects, long term-intergeneration effects, trans-boundary effects, and 
environmental effects (these can be further distinguished as destruction and deferred 
accumulation verses legacy cost). Short and medium term costs are more apparent and include 
the direct cost mentioned previously. Various models
65
 measure the economic growth framework 
including both direct and indirect impact of conflict on physical capital, human capital, and 
intuitions. War can devastate the economy in regards to land, labor, and capital; the loss of assets 
(land, livestock, means of income, etc.) leads to smaller economies of scale and less purchasing 
power resulting in further market distortion.
66
 Human capital, in the form of labor, represents a 
vital asset for any functioning economy. Implicit human capital costs include the loss of life and 
permanent injuries that reduce the long-term availability of labor in a society. For many, conflict 
interrupts educational opportunities, reducing the availability of skilled labor. Building upon this, 
high levels of refugees and internally displaced persons cause significant swings in the labor 
force in a given geographical region during and after the presence of conflict.   
 
                                                 
64 For further reference review Keynesian effective demand / multiplier effect 
65 For example, the neo-classical economic approach, Keynesian economics, disequilibrium effects, the role of technology in production 
advancements, modernization, etc.  
66 MacDonald, M.H. (2006). Private Sector Development in Reintegration and Reconstruction Programmes. Berlin: Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ). 
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Figure 1.3 GDP per capita in Post-Conflict Countries
67
 
 
 
There are numerous approaches to measuring the cost of conflict; the following depicts 
both the accounting and counterfactual approach. Dunne, as influenced by Lindgen – de Groote 
et al, provides Figures 1.1 to summarize the counterfactual analysis and the accounting method, 
depicted above with Figure 1.3, which illustrates the legacy cost of a conflict in displaying 
potential growth lost by comparison with a GDP trajectory. Research suggests that the “cost lies 
somewhere between 1.7 and 3.3 percent of GDP per country per conflict year prior to 1990 and 
averaging 12.3 percent of GDP post-1990”68 with three main types of cost: current, legacy, and 
spill-over.
69
 Current accounting cost calculations reference both the direct and indirect impact of 
violence in a set time and place while legacy costs are those that continue beyond the course of 
conflict including human capital cost due to injury and inability to work, and environmental 
devastation that reduce productivity. Spill-over, an indirect cost, refers to those imposed on by-
standers to conflict as illustrated by the presence of refugees or internal displaced persons 
impacting both the labor market and the need for social service provision.  
                                                 
67 Ohiorhenuan, John; Stewart, Frances (2008): Post-Conflict Economic Recovery: Enabling Local Ingenuity. UNDP Crisis Prevention and 
Recovery Report, Figure 4.2. 
68 Ohiorhenuan, John; Stewart, Frances (2008): 35. 
69 Brauer, Jurgen and Dunne, Paul (2010): 4. 
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To analyze how ‘collective violence perturbs the economic system,’70 it is helpful to take 
a basic look at the supply and demand side of the economy. On the supply, the spikes in input 
prices from rising cost of production and decline in employment depend on intensity, duration, 
and spatial reach of the violence.
71
 Regarding demand, consumption, investment, and exports fall 
while an increase in imports increases to substitute for domestic reduction in production that may 
further depress living standards. The continual decrease in government taxable revenue requires 
the state to “try to borrow, increase its debt load, and inject spending, especially military-related 
spending, into the economy to prop it up. But replacement of private by public economic activity 
is not a viable long-run economy strategy” for stability.72 The “main economic purpose of 
trading currency is to facilitate the exchange of trade and services across currency boundaries” 
but conflict significantly impacts exchange rates and the potential for trade.
73
 The appreciation of 
currency diminishes exports, due to the price increase for foreigners, and encourages imports. 
This leads to a decrease in surplus and potential increase in government deficit causing a decline 
in aggregate demand, reducing both economic growth and employment. While appreciation of 
demand is not favorable for the aforementioned reasons, it can decrease the price of imports 
allowing consumers and producers to operate with low inflation costs while appreciation also 
incentivizes domestic producers to be more efficient in order to compete in the marketplace.  
The prevalence of violence and insecurity results in a “loss of business opportunities, 
increased country credit risk, and macroeconomic instability reflected in a devalued currency and 
inflation” with serious consequences for economic activity.74 This phenomenon leads to lower 
returns on investment and discourages private sector investment impacting the low or negative 
growth rate resulting in decreased capacity to absorb labor and therefore a loss of jobs, incomes, 
and livelihood.
75
 As addressed previously, this influences the growth of the informal economy 
decreasing government revenue and consequently the provision of social services to address 
indirect human capital cost of declining health and education. This relates to the guns verse 
butter
76
 theory that the decision to spend money on militarization in an effort to provide the 
                                                 
70 Brauer, Jurgen and Dunne, Paul (2010) 
71 Brauer, Jurgen and Dunne, Paul (2010): 18. 
72 Brauer, Jurgen and Dunne, Paul (2010): 18. 
73 Brauer, Jurgen and Dunne, Paul (2010): 37. 
74 Bagwitz, Daniel; Becker, Sabine; Elges, Reinhold; Goretzky, Wulf; Hofmann, Armin; Hilal, Tarig; Krech, Robert; Kruk, Gabriele (2008): 5. 
75 Mills, Rob; Fan, Qimiao (2006): The Investment Climate in Post-Conflict Situations. Washington, DC: The World Bank. 
76 Dunne, John Paul; Smith, Ron; Willenbockel, Dirk (2004): Models of Military Expenditure and Growth: A Critical Review. Bristol, UK: 
University of West of England 
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public good of security, may result in the opportunity cost of not providing social services for the 
public and shifting production away for other non-military goods. While military expenditures 
can stimulate growth and government revenue (as seen with the Military Industrial Complex in 
America), it must be acknowledged that all military expenditure represents a trade-off and 
potential shift away from another socio-economic preferred good or service. 
Lastly, any discussion of economic cost of conflict must acknowledge the erosion of 
social capital. Putnam defines the concept of social capital as features of “social organization 
such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual 
benefit”.77 These bonds between individuals result in civic engagement that can have positive 
benefits in regards to “education, urban poverty, unemployment, the control of crime and drug 
abuse, and even health.”78  Furthermore, the “networks of civic engagement foster sturdy norms 
of generalized reciprocity and encourage the emergence of social trust. Such networks facilitate 
coordination and communication, amplify reputations, and thus allow dilemmas of collective 
action to be resolved.”79 Economically, social capital allows for a reduction in transaction costs 
such as monitoring, negotiating, litigating, and enforcing formal agreements that go along with 
contracts and formalized exchanges
80
 while contributing to poverty alleviation, inequality 
reduction, and economic growth.
81
 The destruction of these mechanisms increases transaction 
costs and stimulates informality and subsistence sectors, thus preventing the realization of full 
economic potential.  
Conclusion 
 
In a seminal World Bank report, Collier’s described the ‘conflict trap’ illustrating that  
 
conflict weakens the economy and leaves a legacy of atrocities. It also creates leaders and 
organizations that have invested in skills and equipment that are only useful for violence. 
Disturbingly, while the overwhelming majority of the population in a country affected by 
civil war suffers from it, the leaders of military organizations that are actually 
perpetrating the violence often do well out of it. The prospect of financial gain is seldom 
the primary motivation for rebellion, but for some it can become a satisfactory way of 
life.
82
 
                                                 
77 Putnam, Robert (1995): Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital. An Interview with Robert Putnam. Journal of Democracy, 
6(1):65-78. http://xroads.virginia.edu/~HYPER/DETOC/assoc/bowling.html#FOOT4 
78 Putnam, Robert (1995) 
79 Putnam, Robert (1995) 
80 Fukuyama, Francis (2001): Social capital, civil society, and development. Third World Quarterly, 22(1):10. 
81 Krishna, Anirudh; Shrader, Elizabeth (1999): Social Capital Assessment Tool. Prepared for the Conference on Social Capital and Poverty 
Reduction, June 22-24 1999. Washington, DC: The World Bank. 
82 Collier, Paul (2003) 
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Accordingly, the duration of war has increased, in part, due to both the ease of access in 
financing rebellions and acquiring arms as well as the profits to be gained from the war 
economy. In general, conflict decreases domestic productivity and exports, reduces tax revenue, 
increases government expenditures, increases government deficit, decreases private sector 
activity, declines per capita income and increases unemployment, appreciates the exchange rate, 
and disincentives investment; all of these factors significantly impact the livelihoods and future 
survival of households, businesses, and the state. An understanding of the functioning of war 
economies and the cost of conflict described in this chapter build the foundation for an 
exploration of economic reconstruction and the need to provide economic incentives for peace. 
Conflict is not irrational, and actors whether civilians or combatants (government or rebels), 
must balance incentives, opportunities, and feasibility calculations to determine their 
participation in and reaction to conflict. Analyzing the control of resources (whether property, 
human capital, or natural resource, etc.) and acknowledging competition for power is vital for an 
understanding of conflict that cannot occur without adequate financing. Accordingly, the 
literature alludes to the fact “that economic development is critical for reducing the incidence of 
civil war”83 and “if the incidence of civil war is to be reduced … it will need to be made more 
difficult.”84 Economic activity does not end during the course of a conflict; on the contrary, 
“economic aspects related to labor, capital, trade, and finance can motivate, drive, prolong, and 
terminate violence.”85   
Chapter Two: Paradigms of Economic Reconstruction  
 
Chapter One established a foundational understanding of the economic triggers and costs 
of conflict; it is important to comprehend that “economics co-determine the prospects for the 
success or failure of peace” and “the design and execution of postwar economic policies help 
determine the success or failure of peace. Not merely preventing relapse into war, the proper 
design and implementation of economic policies can be among the primary instruments for 
preventing armed violence in the first place”.86 In analyzing post-1960 economic development 
paradigms, this chapter will illustrate the characteristics of standard economic development 
verses economic reconstruction / recovery, “the process of rebuilding degraded, damaged, or 
                                                 
83 Collier, Paul; Hoeffler, Anke; Rohner, Dominic (2009) 
84 Collier, Paul; Hoeffler, Anke; Rohner, Dominic (2009) 
85 Brauer, Jurgen and Dunne, Paul (2010) 
86 Brauer, Jurgen and Dunne, Paul (2010) 
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destroyed political, socioeconomic, and physical infrastructure of a country or territory to create 
the foundation for long-term development”.87 This chapter will illustrate the evolution in 
economic development paradigms and articulate that ill-conceived economic development 
policies implemented in sub-Saharan African countries post-independence failed to enable the 
creation of an environment devoid of violent conflict. As aforementioned, the concept of 
conflicts economies is circular regarding which is the cause and which is the byproduct. It is not 
argued that the policies of donor countries, international financial institutions, and the newly 
formed democracies caused conflict, but there is evidence to the fact that the environment 
created by these policies failed to promote sustainable peace.  
Economic development is a dynamic concept with complex definitions that incorporate 
the building of economic capability to support competition as well as the creation of jobs, 
wealth, and improved quality of life. Broadly defined, it is a process and set of activities over a 
sustained period of time that impact economics of a community. According to the International 
Economic Development Council (IECD), economic development includes: 
 
 Policies that the government undertakes to meet broad economic objectives including inflation control, 
high employment and sustainable growth  
 Policies and programs to provide services including building highways, managing parks and providing 
medical access to the disadvantaged  
 Policies and programs explicitly directed at improving the business climate through specific efforts, 
business finance, marketing, neighborhood development, business retention and expansion, technology 
transfer, real estate development and other
88
  
 
While, the Marshall Plan (1947 – 48) serves as a reference point for post-conflict 
economic development, the post-Cold War era is characterized by less of a need for rebuilding 
formalized political structures and economies. More recent post-conflict environments are 
plagued with low-levels of development after intrastate war; there is a need to both rebuild basic 
infrastructure and service in addition to “the establishment of an adequate basic economic 
framework necessary for effective policymaking in a market-based economy, productive 
utilization of large volumes of aid, and creation of national reconciliation programs”.89  
                                                 
87 USIP Glossary of Terms (2012): “Reconstruction.” http://glossary.usip.org/resource/reconstruction.  
88 Community and Regional Development Institute: “Definitions of Economic Development.” Cornell University. 
http://www.cals.cornell.edu/cals/devsoc/outreach/cardi/calendarevents/upload/DefinitionsEconomicDevelopment.pdf 
89 del Castillo, Graciana (2011): “The Economics of Peace: 5 Rules for Effective Reconstruction”. Washington, DC: United States Institute of 
Peace, Special Report 286. 
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It is important to acknowledge that “economic reconstruction amid the complex transition 
to peace is fundamentally different from long-term development”.90 An immediate, integrated 
strategy must be implemented in the aftermath of conflict to address the various transitions 
required to enable durable peace;  
crime and violence must surrender to public security (the security transition). 
Lawlessness and political exclusion must give way to the rule of law, political 
participation, good governance, and respect for human and property rights (the political 
transition). Ethnic, religious, class, or other confrontation must be addressed (the social 
transition). War-ravaged or chaos-affected countries must become functioning economies 
that enable crises-affected groups and other ordinary people to make a decent and honest 
living (the economic transition).
91
  
 
Accordingly, a focus on sequencing and prioritization of activities and transitions is paramount. 
For example, reconstruction aid for (re)-activation of vital industries, building infrastructure, and 
service provision must occur in the first stages while emphasis on “elections, institutions, 
policies, governance, security, and human capacity may have to follow” these first steps.92 These 
trade-offs and accompanying inputs and outputs will be further discussed. The evolution in 
paradigms of economic development to be discussed encompass: (1) 1960s control regimes and 
post-independence economics; (2) 1970s attempted industrialization and crisis; (3) 1980s 
Washington Consensus; and (4) 1990s poverty reduction strategies.
93
 
 
1960s – 1973: Post – Independence Economics 
 
The social, political, and economic development of the post-independence sub-Saharan 
African countries in the 1960s and 1970s were influenced by the economic, colonial history of 
the region. While there are significant impacts on socio-economic growth from the colonial era 
that are beyond the scope of this paper, of note are the extractive methods of the colonial state, 
the former methods of control and bureaucratic governance, the division of ethnic groups, 
contestation over resources, and the method of gaining independence. All of these factors and 
others had varying effects on conflict and economic development in post-colonial countries. 
In the 1960s, a period of developmentalism and state intervention characterized young 
countries across the developing world. This post-independence era in sub-Saharan Africa 
                                                 
90 del Castillo 2011: 2  
91 del Castillo 2011: 2  
92 del Castillo 2011: 3 
93Zoellick, Robert (2011): A Timeline of Development Economics at the World Bank. Adapted from “Democratizing Development 
Economics,” a speech by World Bank President Robert Zoellick at Georgetown University, September 29, 2011. 
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witnessed high initial growth and optimism for the region. For example, Ghana’s per capita 
income and export levels exceeded those of South Korea at the time.
94 
The prevailing economic 
theory of the time was that of capital infusion to solve poverty and underdevelopment with major 
interventionist projects. The dominance of control regimes highlighted the power of the state and 
the emphasis on social engineering and self-sustained growth. Public policy supported “inward 
industrialization based on high tariffs and state subsides” with the hope that “with time these 
policies would lead to the emergence of viable industries”.95 Unfortunately, these flawed policies 
led to pervasive market failures and economic stagnation.  
 
1973 – 1980s: Attempted Industrialization and Crisis 
 
By the mid-1970s and 1980s, many countries experienced agricultural crisis with decline 
in per capita production. Africa’s share in world commodity trade declined significantly as did 
its rise in food aid dependence with food grain imports over two decades.
 
To illustrate the decline 
in production, 15 out of the 39 sub-Saharan African countries witnessed negative growth per 
capita in the 1970s. The 1973 Oil Crisis “signified the end of [the] African honeymoon” of rapid 
growth in the 1960s and the brief post-independence era of growth.
96 
During this time, 
“governments combine[d] efforts to win legitimacy by highlighting the competence of their rule, 
on the one hand, with a continuing wariness of greater political participation and accountability, 
on the other”.97 The control regime paradigm of the 1960s had presumed the presence of a 
robust, capable nation state and that those in power would institute policies to increase the 
livelihood of the populous.
98
 Instead, similar to the colonial state before it, newly independent 
African states were often ruled by a new ‘political elite.’ States were weak in the periphery and 
struggled to obtain legitimacy of rule across their borders. This was further complicated by 
competition for resources, often along ethnic lines, which lead to patronage politics to 
consolidate power. The political interest of the state lead to poor economic decisions with a focus 
on short-term revenue growth; destructive policies included the overvaluation of currency and 
                                                 
94 Schrire, Robert (2005): Economic Policy Since 1960 – Progress and Retrogression. Printed version provided by University of Cape Town, 
4. 
95 Schrire, Robert (2005): 6 
96 Schrire, Robert (2005): 4. 
97 Levy, Brian; Fukuyama, Francis (2010): Development Strategies: Integrating Governance and Growth. Policy Research Working Paper 
5196, The World Bank. http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2010/01/28/000158349_20100128134131/ 
Rendered/PDF/WPS5196.pdf  
98 For future reference see Ekeh, Peter P (1975): Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement. Comparative Studies in 
Society and History, 17(1):91-112.  
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negative interest rates to encourage consumption. Accordingly, the state interventionist and 
control regimes paradigm contributed to a download spiral of “economic mismanagement – 
economic decline – foreign borrowing – effective bankruptcy” in the 1970s.99 African states 
were seen as parasitic in their reliance on development assistance leading to limited private 
sector investment growth opportunities and failing to address economic grievances of the 
population. 
The 1980s exhibited a sharp turn away from the strong role of the state after the 
economic decline in the 1960s and 1970s and resulting market failures. Guiding paradigms for 
economic development from international financial institutions called for corrective behavior to 
state-lead growth. The shifting economic development paradigm prescribed: (1) reduction in the 
role for the state, (2) emphasis on exports / agriculture, (3) creation of economic incentives, and 
(4) significant increases in foreign assistance as highlighted by the structural adjustment 
programs of the Bretton Woods institutions.  
The Berg Report, “Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for 
Action,” emphasized the importance of structural (history, politics, and geography) and external 
factors (price shocks) when analyzing the significance of increases in economic growth; for 
example, countries emerging from conflict scenarios experience a large, relative growth rate 
because their past progress was minimal. Economic development paradigms should understand 
that growth is influenced by numerous factors including whether or not a country has 
experienced (or is experiencing) conflict, is landlocked, has natural resources, is democratic or 
autocratic, etc. Accordingly, there are many systems by which researchers have classified 
African states; for example -- diversified economies, oil exporters, transition economies, and pre-
transition economies as illustrated by the McKinsey Global Institute.
100
Regardless of method of 
categorization, the 1980s economic paradigms codifications represent attempts to acknowledge 
the importance of context-specific development efforts.  
International financial institutions’ imposition of an emphasis on exports, increased aid, 
and reduction in the role of the state in the 1980s led to further economic deficiencies as the 
paradigm did not account for external factors such as terms of trade and the need to integrate 
Africa into the world economy in a manner in which it would not be dependent on primary 
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commodities. Instead, the conditional incentives and prices created market failures on the supply 
side. Weak States were further undermined by financial constraints with limited social services 
for the poor and exacerbating inequality and grievances.  
To make matters worse, countries in Africa that participated in the IMF’s Enhanced 
Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) saw a decline in income that would take years to 
overcome. They experienced negative implications from a lack of government spending on 
health, education, and sanitation vital to development for the poor. Moreover, attempts to reduce 
debt burdens with IMF mandated macroeconomic policies and Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
(HIPC) failed; instead, the debt burdens increased as a share of both GNP and GDP from 1985 – 
1995. Poor, developing countries continued to spend resources on external debt relief instead of 
being able to fund health care and education; this realization was cause for a movement away 
from import substitution industrialization (ISI) policies.
101
 
In understanding that the success of economic development is influenced by structural 
factors including history, politics, geography, and climate as well as external factors including oil 
price shocks, food price shocks, and falling mineral prices or declining terms of trade,; 
government responses to these factors may have long term implications for economic livelihood. 
For example, overvalued exchanges rates in former Zaire, Tanzania, Ghana, and Nigeria 
negatively impacted the countries’ respective agricultural sectors by incentivizing cheap food 
imports and decreases in the price of exports. Poor agricultural policies not only countered pro-
poor growth but resulted in a lack of resources, inefficient price structures, over-investment in 
large schemes, and inequality. Furthermore, such tactics led to market inefficiencies including 
misguided import substituting industrialization with excessive protection, overburdening of the 
public sector, and even corruption regarding access to import licenses.
 
 
 
1990s: Striking a Balance 
 
The economic development strategy of the 1980s was based on assumptions about 
agriculture being a source of cheap labor for industrialization in a world that was skeptical about 
the ability of developing countries to access international markets. Developing countries 
experienced falling exports, rising debt (in which only 15 out of 44 SSA countries were able to 
service their debts from 1980 – 1985), and fiscal problems including budget constraints that 
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limited the performance of basic government functions. These and other factors dis-incentivized 
investment as illustrated by a significant decline (over 5%) in the investment rate from by the 
mid-1980s in sub-Saharan Africa.  
In the 1990s, the international financial institutions and governments began to realize that 
structural and market-oriented reforms were extremely slow in producing the desired results. The 
Washington Consensus, built on the foundational principles of the Berg Report, established a set 
of 10 policies for economic growth implemented through conditionality by the US and 
international financial (Bretton Woods) institutions. This framework crafted the economic 
paradigm of structural and macroeconomic adjustment in response to the economic challenges of 
the 1960s – 1980s. The 1980s and 1990s was characterized by stabilization and structural 
adjustment policies implemented by the IMF and World Bank. The IMF’s imposition of 
stabilization consisted of demand restraint and devaluation of currency for developing countries, 
coupled with policy instruments including mobilization of domestic resources (fiscal policies and 
improved financial performance of public enterprises), improved efficiency of resource use 
(public sector reform and privatization, price decontrol, reduced subsidies, import liberalization, 
credit reform), and institutional reforms (strengthening capacity of public sector).  
Although broadly defined, the Washington Consensus development paradigm of fiscal 
discipline has been criticized for a ‘neo-colonial’ approach. Despite ‘good intentions’ and the 
revelations of the 1980s Berg Report, agricultural trade continued to deteriorate during this time 
period and there was an over-reliance on price incentives, resulting in neglect of structural 
constraints and a reduction in rural infrastructure investment. In contrast to ISI
102
 of the early 
time periods, the Washington Consensus triggered widespread de-industrialization, resulting in a 
reduction in labor productivity, limited export diversification due to dependence on primary 
exports, and a decreased share of GDP from manufacturing. Consequences of the new paradigm 
were two-fold, constituting both success and failure. For example, promotion of exports not only 
benefitted large corporations, but also brought about a challenge for subsistence farmers to meet 
domestic needs. Encouragement of privatization was seen as negatively impacting 
unemployment as business ownership and jobs shifted to foreigners instead of improving the 
livelihood of citizens. Once again, employment challenges and the decrease in government 
socio-economic spending negatively impacted social service provisions. These factors can be 
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linked to economic grievances that may have influenced incentives for violent conflict as 
explained in Chapter One and exemplified by countries in war during the 1990s.  
 
Mid-1990s – 2000s: Cautious Resurgence 
 
The pattern of growth in Africa began to experience resurgence in the last decade. 
According to the McKinsey Global Institute, Africa’s collective GDP is predicted to reach $2.6 
trillion in 2020 and real GDP witnessed a 4.9% increase per year from 2000 to 2008, which is in 
stark contrast to the declines in the previous decade.
103
 Although significant growth is apparent, 
it is important to contextualize the optimism: collective GDP of $1.6 trillion in 2008 for the 
entire region is compared to the singular countries of Brazil or Russia. However, Africa has 60% 
of the world’s total amount of uncultivated, arable land. Although aggregate growth statistics 
provide a case for optimism, the question remains as to whether such growth is sustainable and 
what underlying causes enhance achievement of sustainability. Context specific economic 
development, coupled with continued good governance and improved macroeconomic policies, 
will enhance the investment climate and allow sustainable growth. In understanding the various 
paradigms of the 1960 – 2000 time period, this overview acknowledges the shifting view of the 
role of the State in fostering economic growth. Accordingly, structural change in both the private 
and public sectors in addition to economic factors such as increases in commodity prices are 
responsible for economic growth in the past decade and moving forward.
104
 
 
Present Day Post-Conflict, Context Specific Economic Development  
 
Post-conflict economic reconstruction is distinguished from broader economic 
development as “economic programs, especially when conflict-sensitive, can minimize the 
detrimental effects of conflicts while maximizing the potential benefits to specific target 
groups”.105  Conflict-sensitive and context-specific policies and interventions are best crafted 
after needs assessments to gather information about political, social, and economic contextual 
realities as “development interventions with the objective of promoting economic growth need a 
profound assessment of both the conflict and peace dynamics, as well as the political economy of 
                                                 
103 Roxburgh, Charles et al. (2012) 
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the respective country”.106 Purely economic focused policies and programs will not prevent, 
mitigate, or help end conflict in developing countries leading to sustainable growth and peace. In 
addition to needing economists, this context requires development specialists, socio-political 
scientists, technical specialists, and country experts to adequately evaluate a post-conflict setting 
for both political landscape
107
 and economic perspectives
108 
from all levels of society (household, 
firm, and national).  
The international financial institutions, donor countries, and NGOs have continually 
evaluated and adapted their approaches to economic development. While the lessons learned and 
best practices have evolved, it is vital to acknowledge the specific context of a post-conflict 
economic environment as discussed in Chapter One. For example, one of the most critical tasks 
in post-conflict reconstruction efforts is (re)-building trust, “highlighting the importance of social 
capital development”.109 This task can manifest itself in various programs across all sectors of 
society; emphasis is often placed on reconciliation among perpetrators and victims. However, as 
it concerns a need for justice for victims in the immediate / short term, a balance must be struck 
with long term goals of sustainable peace. Oslen et al cites the justice-development trade-off 
which acknowledges the opportunity costs of spending economic resources on justice 
mechanisms that could be utilized for other purposes including social service provision, job 
growth stimulation, skills training, etc. Furthermore, while justice mechanisms deliver various 
forms of justice or truth to address emotional well-being, some of these approaches do not 
contribute to the economic well-being of communities. After conflict in an effort to establish a 
means of income (survival) outside of the war economy, there is a pressing need for the 
population (both former combatants and victims) to have a means by which to provide a 
livelihood. This illustrates how transitioning societies face pressing economic concerns that may 
compete with transitional justice considerations for economic, social, and political prioritization. 
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Transitional justice may be deemed a luxury that cannot be afforded by many new democracies; 
furthermore, “long-term legitimacy and strength of the democratic system in fragile economics… 
demand that country leaders address more pressing needs”.110 
This author does acknowledge that transitional justice is important for sustainable peace, 
as well as addressing the underlying and precipitating factors of conflict, which include social 
distrust and lack of / unequal economic opportunities. Providing citizens with the ability to earn 
incomes and productively contribute to society can not only mitigate incentives for violence, but 
can also improve exchange between former victims and victimizers, demonstrating how 
economic development and the pursuit of growth can contribute to peace. In understanding that 
trust is of economic value,
111
 post-conflict economic reconstruction programs address not only 
good governance and institutional reform, but also priorities for building a community of trust. If 
restorative justice is acknowledged as a mechanism by which to achieve reconciliation, "not so 
much of punishing perpetrators for wrongs in the past or knowing the truth, but taking steps to 
address the victims’ situation through the restoration of the physical, psychological, social and 
economic well-being of the individual,” then the contributions of social capital to both the well-
being of the victims and the community address both economic and justice needs of post-conflict 
society.
112
 This tool’s relational factor “functions via its facilitation of inter-human interactions 
and relationships in the form of cooperation and coordination and enables production actors to 
manage social and political crisis,” facilitating the transitions to peace in a post-conflict 
environment.
113
 Reconciliation mechanisms, whether “in the form of reparations, restitution and / 
or broader provision of economic goods (employment, infrastructure, and industries)” hold that 
“the material and economic well-being of the individual victim and the community is” vital to 
transitional justice.
114
 Accordingly, ex-combatant reintegration program illustrate this concept by 
“positively impact[ing] conflict resolution processes and … rebuilding … social capital” 
contributing to both peace and restorative justice in addressing material and economic well-being 
of the community.
115
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Economically, social capital allows for a reduction in transaction costs such as 
monitoring, negotiating, ligating, and enforcing formal agreements that go along with contracts 
and formalized business exchanges,
116
 while also contributing to poverty alleviation, inequality 
reduction, and economic growth in complex environments.
117,118 
More specifically, the channels 
through which social capital influences economic development include: (1) lowering the cost and 
increasing the availability of information sharing via participation in social networks, (2) 
collective decision making and shared implementation as result of widespread participation and 
mutual trust, (3) and societal pressure to reduce harmful behavior. These contributions are 
realized by trusted dissemination of information regarding prices, markets, access to credit, 
governance regulations, and best practices to increase economic productivity. Furthermore, 
collective decision making concerning distribution and management of resources (land, water, 
waste disposal, etc.) is vital for survival of a given community and the building of social capital 
to engage a diverse subset of the community in decision making, reducing opportunity behavior 
that could be detrimental.
119 
 
The question remains – how to build trust in a post-conflict setting while also promoting 
peace, addressing justice, dis-incentivizing conflict, rebuilding the public sector, and developing 
the economy? The public sector can best contribute to social capital development by addressing 
security, governance, and improving the business climate to indirectly increase social capital; for 
example, “people cannot associate, volunteer, vote, or take care of one another if they fear for 
their lives when walking down the street. Given a stable and safe environment for public 
interaction and property rights, it is more likely that trust will arise spontaneously as a result of 
iterated interactions of rational individuals.”120 According to Fred-Mensah, “…the major role of 
institutions in a society is to reduce uncertainty by establish[ing] a stable structure to human 
interaction” which has major implications for economic growth.121 Therefore, holistic 
institutional reform is paramount for building an environment that fosters trust (both among 
citizens as well as between citizens and their government) so that social capital can be utilized in 
a developmental capacity to promote peace and economic well-being during reconstruction.  
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Implicit in post-conflict reconstruction is the demand for justice and improved 
relationships in the aftermath of violence. While transitional justice activities are critical to 
reconciliation, private sector development contributes to the peacebuilding and conflict-
resolution approach to reconciliation that “emphasize[s] building new and peaceful relationships, 
bridging divides, [and] establishing trust” through a variety of processes.122 To address the 
concern that a focus on economic development does not address justice, Oduro explores David 
Whittaker’s societal-based definition of reconciliation that addresses the need for a “renewed 
sense of order and [ability] to make improvements in the material welfare of the people (e.g. 
basic needs of shelter, food and other public amenities)” for individuals to feel secure.123 
Accordingly, societal transformation requires “provision of economic goods for equitable social 
advancement”.124 To prevent a relapse in violent conflict, societies must address the political and 
economic inequalities “which [may be] the products of past oppressions and are the sources of 
conflict and estrangement [which] need to be reconstructed and transformed to give meaning to 
reconciliation”.125 
Structural Adjustment and Poverty Reduction Examples 
 
After 27 years of conflict, warring parties agreed to a ceasefire in 1990, and a peace 
accord in 1992 ended years of violence in Mozambique. Similar to other developing countries of 
that time, Mozambique participated in the 1986 Economic Reconstruction Program and 1996 
Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiatives of the World Bank and IMF. As previously 
acknowledged, these structural adjustment programs had numerous negative implications for 
economic growth and even political and socio-economic stability. First and foremost, they were 
not implemented with a sensitive understanding of the ongoing conflict and further undermined 
the role of the Frelimo party in providing governance and macroeconomic stability.  
The policies were counterproductive to human development and failed to adequately 
address the benefits of the agricultural sector. Eased price controls influenced increases in the 
price of food, leading to reductions in both food and rent subsidies in accordance with social 
services reduction and initiating of fees for health and education. “At the same time, wage 
increases were not sufficient for many workers to deal with the price increases, and the burden of 
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adjustment fell disproportionately on the poor,” demonstrating the opposite of pro-poor 
growth.
126
  
Structural adjustment policies failed to be conflict sensitive and address the powerful 
legacies of the war. Accordingly, the growth that resulted from these policies was misleading and 
contributed to further inequality, specifically along urban versus rural lines. The government 
failed to address this until the end of conflict at the initiation of private sector development and 
pro-poor growth. By this point, the government was enabled to support direct allocation of 
resources to the most vulnerable populations as a means of poverty alleviation and economic 
growth in the 1990s.   
Chapter Three: Private Sector Development Framework  
 
Economic reconstruction strategies are continuously evolving given the changing nature 
of post-conflict environments and learning curve of governments, the international financial 
institutions, donor countries, and other actors. This chapter highlights the post-conflict private 
sector development (PSD) economic paradigm, defined as the set of activities undertaken to 
promote growth and reduce poverty by developing a “productive, sustainable, and market-
oriented private sector.”127 This strategic approach addresses “the twin goals of economic growth 
and peace, in other words, ... strengthen[s] conditions for the growth of a stable, accessible, and 
competitive private sector and …contributes to a lasting and durable peace.”128 In understanding 
that private sector development is a multifaceted approach, this chapter will acknowledge the 
competing priorities and importance of conflict-sensitive operations that do not undermine the 
state or exacerbate inequalities by repeating the mistakes of the past. In conducting an 
assessment of both the investment climate reform and interventionists strategies of PSD, the 
following sections argue in favor of a hybrid / integrated approach. Both the investment climate 
and interventionist approaches to private sector development highlight removing systematic 
constraints on growth exports and the importance of conflict-sensitive, pro-poor growth. There is 
significant overlap of the two as illustrated by the Making Markets Work for the Poor (M4P) 
methodology which is interventionist in approach but transformative of the system and 
investment climate.
129 
Accordingly, an integrated framework of private sector development is 
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more sustainable and effectively contributes to post-conflict reconstruction by fostering pro- 
poor growth and economic development. This is achieved in partnership with all sectors of 
society while also acknowledging the limited capacities and challenges of these partnerships.  
The argument for an integrated approach to PSD acknowledges that “private sector development 
results from an implicit contract between the private sector, the state, and civil society [in which] 
the priorities for change … depend on the factors that the main stakeholders believe are 
undermining the contract or may help to improve it” for the benefit of the populous.130  
Investment Climate: Macroeconomic Stabilization  
 
Post-conflict economies are plagued with macroeconomic instability including inflation, 
incorrectly valued currency rates, unemployment, inequality among those who benefit from the 
war economy, human and economic insecurity, limited availability of skilled labor, constrained 
mobility, and horizontal inequality. Accordingly, private sector development must operate in the 
absence of robust financial institutions and macroeconomic stability. The investment climate 
approach seeks to engage the public sector and addresses the conditions under which economic 
growth can occur; therefore, it utilizes public and 
private sector tools to achieve macroeconomic 
stabilization for growth by addressing legal 
reforms, business regulations, and infrastructure 
(i.e. basic inputs, transportation, and 
communication) projects. The difficulty of this 
approach is the limited capacity of a government, 
public sector counterpart; accordingly, 
development of the private sector should promote 
both the development of government capacity and 
macroeconomic stabilization. 
The Investment Climate approach is 
distinct in that its “programming is directed 
towards improving the economy as a whole, 
rather than directly helping specific individuals or 
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businesses”; accordingly, it lays the foundation for growth, peace, and stability.131 For immediate 
impact, macroeconomic stabilization requires availability of currency for financial institutions, 
governments, and citizens to facilitate economic activity. A focus on creation of “efficient, 
accountable, and transparent financial institutions can encourage trust in central government and 
strengthen the authority of a weak state” coming out of conflict.132 In the absence of robust 
financial intuitions, donors are necessary to assist governments with: (1) budgets, (2) controlling 
spending, (3) keeping track of receipts, (4) reducing borrowing, and (5) budget support as 
macroeconomic stabilization requires stabilization of currency, reining in inflation, and 
maintaining steady prices.
133 
 
Investment climate development activities include public works infrastructure projects 
(see Figure 3.1
134
) which allow “… jobs to be created quickly, create assets, release commerce 
from constraints, add to capacity, [and] facilitate access to economic and social services, 
stimulate economic growth, and of course assist in the demobilization and reintegration of 
combatants”.135 Capital for such infrastructure development is often derived from public-private 
partnerships. Electrical utility is one of the most foundational areas of infrastructure development 
required to do business in post-conflict, developing countries. Utilizing public-private 
partnerships to develop this capacity, the public sector can give “the concessions or pu[t] in place 
tariffs for buying electricity … while the private sector can provide some of the money, and 
build and operate the infrastructure. Not only does that offer the benefit of financing, but also, 
very often, the systems become more effective and better maintained and, therefore, have a 
longer life”.136 Access to electricity, and not just individualized owned generators, can 
significantly impact manufacturing abilities, more equitable distribution of access, as well as 
simple household activities such as cooking or providing light for children to do their 
homework.
137 
Rebuilding infrastructure after a devastating conflict is a clear priority of any post-
conflict society and economic development activities should take advantage of funding spikes 
which are highest at the beginning of post-conflict phases; “however, there is rarely the capacity 
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in terms of skilled labor and organizational ability [to] carry out major infrastructure work during 
this early period when the money is available. By the time capacity has been built up, however, 
the funding has usually dried up”.138  These calculations of when to address and prioritize 
investment climate actives are discussed in Chapter Four’s section on sequencing of the private 
sector development implementation.  
The private sector can grow and function in the absence of robust development but basic 
business-enabling infrastructure is necessary; this includes water and electricity, basic input 
supplies, means of transportation, and communication mechanisms. If these inputs are available, 
infrastructure projects can begin to benefit the community, local private sector, and contracting 
companies as “procurement strategies can build on [the] existing private-sector and local labour 
can … be used for construction work, providing jobs and livelihoods for the post-conflict 
population. Infrastructure projects should therefore seek to involve local communities and 
businesses”.139 While instrumental to economic growth, infrastructure projects are costly, time 
consuming, and politically sensitive.
140
 In a post-conflict environment, the interests of various 
stakeholders must be weighed to prevent a reigniting of hostilities or negatively impacting a 
specific demographic. Accordingly, transparency and anti-corruption must be prioritized by both 
private and public sector actors. Therefore, the implementation of (and choice to undertake) 
infrastructure projects must assess the trade-off of state control verse private sector efficiency of 
project management. As with all post-conflict economic activities, the private sector should 
operate in a manner not to undermine the state.  
Governments have five means by which they can address macroeconomic stabilization: 
monetary policy, fiscal policy, legal reforms, business regulations, and trade policy. Private 
sector development necessitates policy creation and implementation to lay the foundation for 
reform. Monetary Policy maintains purchasing power of the state’s currency, controls inflation, 
determines interest rates, and regulates the banking system. In addition to monetary and fiscal 
regulation, “in the long-term it is productive capacity … that improves peoples’ lives” and hence 
it is important to control the printing and injection of money into the economy.
141
 Accordingly, 
in a post-conflict environment, the focus should be on “rebuilding the central bank; regaining 
domestic credibility; reestablishing the internal and external banking and payment systems; 
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rebuilding systems for bank supervision; restarting the provision of credit; reining in the high 
inflation; and dealing with the consequen[ces] [of] currency depreciation on foreign-exchange 
markets”.142 Such reforms emphasize the integration of monetary and fiscal policy necessary in 
the aftermath of conflict given the limited nature of governance and regulatory institutions.   
In addition to monetary and fiscal policy, as aforementioned, it is widely acknowledged 
that government and legal systems are often lacking or non-existent in post-conflict settings; 
accordingly, the development of a favorable investment climate begins with good governance. 
Legal reforms include addressing the rise of informality in the economy and the importance of 
property rights. First and foremost, “formalizing the economy aids the transition from war to 
peace economy, and encourages engagement with the state in a way which bolsters state 
authority”.143 As discussed in Chapter One, the rise of informality negatively impacts the 
government’s ability to generate revenue from taxes for reconstruction efforts; moreover, the rise 
of informality limits the tax base and can increase the burden on the formal economy, reducing 
the incentive to invest in productivity enhancing methods and technology. To correct this, it is 
recommended that governments instill various corrective actions; for example, they can choose 
to address one sector at a time, separate tax and auditing divisions, address ineffective court 
prosecution of evaders and increase penalties for evasion, streamline regulatory burdens, reduce 
red tape, simplify the tax code, shift tax burdens, and address government expenditures.
144 
 In 
addition to the aforementioned legal policy enforcements, property rights are often seen as a pre-
requisite for private sector development intervention as the “unequal property distributions along 
factional, ethnic, or other group lines can potentially sow the seeds of future conflict”; 
accordingly, it is recommended that early legislative action include rewriting property laws 
among other business-related regulations.
145
 
Private sector development can streamline business regulations to address administrative 
and practical barriers to investment. To this effect, donor countries or corporations can act as 
guarantors, brokers, or source of information for investors weary of risk management in post-
conflict environments. Working with governments to provide a “clear and transparent set of 
business regulations” will enable donors to “discourage corruption and hopefully break the 
connection between public office and private business interest” as aforementioned in referencing 
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Peter Ekeh’s “Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement.”146, 147 This 
will require private sector actors to hold themselves accountable in operating within legal 
frameworks and business regulations to prevention corruption and distortion of financial flows. 
Furthermore, the separation of public office and private business interests will contribute to the 
accountability and respectability of the public sector and development of good governance in the 
best interest of the State’s citizens.  
In addition to legal reforms and business regulations, formalized cross-border trade 
generates revenue and dis-incentivizes informality which can reduce the power of a separate 
predatory private sector and incidences of trafficking.
148
  Regulated trade stimulates an 
awareness of international markets and business connections; hence, gaining access to markets 
corresponds with an adoption of value chains and increases economies of scale for economic 
growth by encouraging the local private sector to upgrade in commercialization and 
competitiveness.
149 
To build domestic capacity and improve trade policy, donors can facilitate 
trade across national boundaries and access to foreign markets, assist in brokering trade 
agreements, and provide guarantees of security and fairness to encourage cooperation and 
competition.
150
 This promotion of security and fairness is paramount in post-conflict settings and 
relates to the theory that trading partners do not go to war with each other; this concept is similar 
to the democratic peace theory. Acknowledging that most sub-Saharan conflicts were intrastate 
wars, the parallel idea is that internal trade and robust market economies dis-incentivize war 
between neighbors as it promotes interconnectedness and reliance. As it concerns landlocked 
countries with warring neighbors, border controls and trade tariffs are additional tools of trade 
policy to be utilized by governments in protecting growth and stability from influential, negative 
actors.  
The investment climate approach, as described here, demonstrates how public agencies 
best provide indirect support to private sector development with a “stable macro-economic 
environment, the rule of law, and a set of regulations, policies, and a fiscal regime that are 
clearly communicated and implemented”.151 This environment encourages individuals to engage 
in complex economic activities and benefits the poor by changing the investment climate and 
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cutting some red tape barriers that would keep them in the informal economy. Critics of this 
approach hold that the emphasis on government tools and regulations may have limited impact 
and credibility when implemented on the ground; furthermore, “instead of increasing stability 
through economic growth, structural changes to the macroeconomic system [may] lead to an 
increase in horizontal inequalities, and the renewal of conflict.”152 In acknowledging these 
limitations, it is important to note the preliminary considerations (preconditions) for the 
investment climate approach to improve macroeconomic stabilization; this includes—but is not 
limited to—a secure location, counterparts for business, a demand of goods and services, 
population stability, provision of finances / access to credit, and the development of social 
capital.  
 
Interventionist Approach 
 
The interventionist approach to private sector development holds that instead of focusing 
on the investment climate to indirectly increase employment or investment in support of private 
sector development, that “direct intervention is needed to make a real and tangible difference on 
the ground”.153 This direct approach generates more tangible results with clear beneficiaries, 
produces visible peace dividends, targets specific demographics, and operates despite the 
presence of weak state structures. Therefore, in post-conflict settings where governance is 
lacking, interventionist activities may be more easily implemented without the need for a public 
sector counterpart as they focus on the market itself to stimulate post-conflict private sector 
development. Tools of the interventionist approach include: (1) promotion of market linkages 
and value chains to link economic actors and improve relations; (2) promotion of business 
associations and community groups to rebuild social capital; (3) access to employment and 
vocational training; (4) microfinance for access to credit, financial services, insurance, and 
savings; and (5) targeted support including provision of supplies, equipment, and advisory 
services for relief.
154
 This practical approach to private sector development, as illustrated by the 
Making Markets Work for the Poor (M4P), decreases the risk of a return to conflict by quickly 
creating visible peace dividends given the fear of a relapse of violence in the first five years after 
                                                 
152 Sweeney, Naoise Mac (2008): 51. 
153 Saperstein, Adina and Campbell, Ruth (2008): Accelerating the Transition from Conflict to Sustainable Growth. Microreport  #111. 
Washington, DC: ACDI/VOCA, 1.  
154 Sweeney, Naoise Mac (2008): 51. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 WLKJES003 42 
 
the end of conflict.
155
 While it produces immediate results, this approach calls into question the 
sustainability of such programming and the aggregate impact of a targeted approach without 
good governance.  
Market linkages address the need for trust in economic development, indicative of the 
building of social capital to better facilitate sustainable peace.
156
 Informal war economies often 
engage in ‘above-board’ channels of regional commerce that is mostly illegal as illustrated by 
resource trafficking. Therefore, in a post-conflict setting it is critical to “foste[r] new, legitimate, 
market connections offer[ing] local businesses an alternative to those which had previously 
underpinned the war economy”.157 This requires two activities: (1) practically linking economic 
actors to each other
158
 and (2) circulating information about markets so actors can adjust to 
trends.
159
  (The importance of clear and effective communication between actors is addressed in 
Chapter Four.) Value chains promote sectoral linkages for economic growth and improve 
relationships to build trust and sustain peace. Post-conflict economic development actors and 
donors can engage all three levels of value chains: micro (individual firms), meso (business 
associations and regional distribution), and macro (international agreements and foreign 
markets).
160
 At the meso-level, business associations and community groups are vital in 
promoting government involvement in the private sector in that members can be viewed as a 
group of constituents able to negotiate and organize themselves in favor of specific conditions 
for sustainable growth. Moreover, these organizations increase resilience of actors and buffer 
risks in the market place, which is critical in a post-conflict setting. Inherent in business 
associations and community groups is the building of social capital and trust to enhance market 
interactions and relationships. Business associations can focus on specific sectors of high growth 
and bring together entrepreneurs to encourage formality, innovation, collaboration, and growth. 
Therefore, private sector development intervention can focus on encouraging the development of 
these meso-level actors. Of note is that to be conflict-sensitive, it is critical to have broad 
participation and membership so as to not exacerbate tensions between groups, appear to display 
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favoritism, or to promote inequality. Specifically, community groups must have a wide base to 
avoid embedding interest of the private sector in a given community.
161
  
In addition, to building social capital with value chains, employment and vocational 
training are critical in all stages of improvement and building capacity efforts. In post-conflict 
reconstruction, programming for ex-combatants should be prioritized. In developing countries, 
there are numerous barriers to employment including health, mobility, and education. Ex-
combatants face additional obstacles reintegrating into society; hence, the need for a concerted 
intervention effort. Given the realities of post-conflict environments, not all jobs created during 
or in the immediate aftermath of violence will be sustainable. The tradeoffs between 
sustainability and the immediate need for job creation to promote growth are challenging; it is 
both practical and efficient to establish labor exchange as well as training in existing livelihood 
strategies. This includes basic skill training as well as entrepreneurial knowledge about credit, 
finance, and basic business skills. In the immediate aftermath it is important to acknowledge that 
there will be a shock to the labor supply given the number of ex-combatants (disproportionately 
young males) in need of a means of livelihood outside of that provided by fighting. This 
highlights the significance of reintegration programs and their impact on both peace and growth.  
Interventionist activities include targeted support interventions which directly concern the 
provision of supplies, equipment, advisory services, etc., as well as general knowledge and skills 
of how they are to be utilized.
162
 This allows short-term relief that should be conflict sensitive 
and provided after conducting a needs assessment (as discussed in previous sections). As 
previously discussed, access to finance is a critical element of private sector development; 
accordingly, microfinance institutions and programs have received a wealth of attention. In post-
conflict settings this programming addresses the desperate need for access to credit, financial 
services, insurance, and savings. However, the instability of the population base with high 
mobility and limited capacity may make microfinance interventions less than ideal and 
unsustainable.
163
 The debates about the effectiveness and sustainability of microfinance 
programs and whether or not they promote savings and growth are of note, but the analysis of 
these arguments are beyond the scope of this paper.  
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Governance and Growth Examples 
The increasing demand and price of minerals and raw materials have significantly 
impacted growth in Africa and account for 24% of growth in GDP from 2000 - 2008. However, 
McKinsey Global Institute clarifies that African growth acceleration is not simply a result of a 
resource boom but that a decline in conflict, improved macroeconomic policy, and a focus on 
investment climate for business enabled positive growth. These improvements enabled 
developments in the wholesale and retail trade, transportation, telecommunications, and 
manufacturing sectors, illustrating the effectiveness of private sector development in the 
promotion of economic growth. 
Contrary to the policies of the 1980s in which government failures were seen as worse 
than market failures after the dominance of control regimes, promotion of the investment climate 
approach acknowledges the positive role of the state in providing an environment for economic 
growth: “research shows that good governance fosters sustained growth in the longer term 
through domestic and foreign investment, private sector development, improved public sector 
management and sectoral development”.164 The first step for many African countries in 
achieving a climate for economic growth has been to end conflict and establish macroeconomic 
and political stability. This allows governments to enact macro and microeconomic reforms to 
decrease inflation, foreign debts, and budget deficits establish a more welcoming environment 
not only for investment but also for economic exchange among former ‘enemies.’ 
In sub-Saharan Africa, the 1990s democratization was hoped to represent an end to 
“decades of economic failure, foreign-aid dependency, official venality and incompetence” that 
plagued the region with poor governing capacity.
165
 Post-conflict Mozambique progressed from 
being one of the world’s poorest countries in 1987 to the fastest growing economy in sub-
Saharan Africa by 1996. Increases in foreign investment and privatization were coupled with a 
significant decrease in inflation and high economic growth. By 1999, Mozambique’s GNP 
reached $2 billion, inflation was at 2%, and economic growth hit 10%. However, interventions in 
Mozambique mistakenly prioritized high-tech growth that was not sustainable and did not 
recognize the importance of agricultural development; this reality suggests “that it [is] important 
to undertake reform and restructuring at the same time and to get to know the nature of the post-
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war economy” as this is a prime example of the importance of an integrated investment climate 
and interventionist approach to economic growth that is conflict-sensitive.
166
 
Chapter Four: Challenges in Implementation of Private Sector 
Development 
 
Post-conflict countries across the sub-Saharan region have seen significant growth spurts 
in recent years; however, sustainable growth requires institutional development, governance, and 
adequate policy implementation. In the early 2000s, “the paradigm for private sector 
development was that the poor relied on [small enterprises] for their livelihoods, these businesses 
were disadvantaged and that justified subsidizing their access to knowledge and finance” leading 
to aid dependency and a lack of incentives for adherence to change.
167
 Past economic 
development and poverty alleviation strategies, while focused on facilitating a better livelihood 
for the poor, are still insufficient for economic reconstruction and promotion of peace in post-
conflict countries. While the current private sector development framework, including the 
investment climate and interventionist approach outlined in Chapter Three, successfully 
addresses many of the flawed policies of the 1960s – early 2000s, it still falls short of effectively 
establishing a dynamic private sector and robust institutions where countries are not faced with 
high aid dependency and distributive issues. These problems have negative implications for the 
development of public sector capacity and legitimacy, entrepreneur activity, socio-economic 
stability and robust, sustainable growth of the private sector’s production of goods and services.  
 
Aid Dependency and Distributive Issues  
  
Foreign aid positively contributes to health, education, and infrastructure building; 
however, in conflict settings “the improvised way in which it is channeled, low absorptive 
capacity, weak institutions, and procurement policies put special pressure on both governments 
and donors to use aid effectively and avoid corruption during the transition to peace”.168 
Unfortunately, the volatility of aid flows has created unstable distortions in which growth is 
related to bubbles of large volumes of aid; under these circumstances, price and wage distortions 
can discourage investment and work. Further, as it concerns building capacity, large aid flows 
can “deprive the civil service of needed expertise, since professionals and other skilled people 
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often prefer to work as drivers, interpreters, and sectaries with higher-paying multilateral and 
bilateral agencies and NGOs. This affects not only the government’s capacity to provide services 
and security, but also the current and future productive capacity of the country, since the few 
skilled people are not using their skills and will lose them over time”.169 
Countries in conflict 
experience various stages of 
monetary flow from donors to assist 
facilitation of economic 
development: emergency response, 
humanitarian aid, reconstruction 
assistance, development aid 
(whether project specific or 
government budget assistance), and 
foreign direct investment. These 
stages are not mutually exclusive or collectively exhaustive, nor do they follow suite in a linear 
fashion only. As it concerns the aforementioned paradigms of economic development, the 
movement away from structural adjustment to private sector development and poverty reduction 
strategies has been more inclusive of governments as a hybrid of development assistance and 
foreign direct investment. While this produces tangible results, many critique the policies as 
‘more of the same,’ specifically as it concerns the resulting aid dependency and foreign 
imposition of policy instruments. For example, Mozambique is still characterized by a heavy 
dependence on foreign aid, high inequality and poverty levels, and slow development of sectors 
outside of agriculture. Although regarded as one of the success stories of post-conflict economic 
development, Mozambique’s growth highlights the flawed use of GDP as an indicator of a 
healthy and stable economic stability. In 2005, although FDI reached US$107.9m, this was far 
exceeded by ODA flows of US$1,286m.
170 
Figure 4.1 provides additional information on the 
amount of ODA as share of GNI, illustrating the spikes during the immediate aftermath of 
conflict in the early 1990s. Improvements in GDP are not adequate measures of successful 
economic reconstruction; per capita GDP is a better reflection of inequality, poverty allocation, 
MDGs achievement, education indicator improvements, etc.  
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The international community has responded well to humanitarian crisis and aid spikes in 
the immediate aftermath of conflict; however, resulting externalities negatively impact long-term 
development. Aid can undermine and weaken institutional capacity and accountability leaving 
countries ‘cash poor but project rich’ and further deterring private investment from high debt 
recipients. Therefore, when aid is administered it should stimulate growth and not substitute for 
private sector development. Chapter Two discussed how emergency aid can be detrimental and 
utilized by warlords to exploit the population during conflict and how it negatively impacts 
market structures leading to anomalies during the war economy. To increase the short-lived 
benefits and counter-act unsustainable dependency, scholars suggest that aid is channeled 
through host governments to support national, integrated reconstruction strategies. In the 
aftermath of a conflict, aid should target “investment opportunities that use local capabilities, 
land, and natural resources [to] increase productive capacity. Its economic effect, however, will 
depend on how productively the aid is invested and the effects it has on the labor market, on the 
exchange rate, on reactivating production and trade, and on protecting the environment”.171 
Moreover, to be effective, aid must be integrated into other post-conflict reconstruction priorities 
and activities; this relates to coordination of actors and sequencing of development as 
“reconstruction aid cannot follow a piecemeal approach”.172 This paper referenced Mozambique 
as an example of the negative implications of aid where ODA rose to over 80% of GNI in 1992 
and was still at 55% ten years later; alternatively, El Salvador had a peace agreement in 1992 
with an ODA at 7% of GNI in 1992, 2.5% in 1997, and 1.4% of GNI in 2001.
173
 El Salvador 
began phasing out humanitarian aid early and gave up benefits under US Government Public 
Law 480
174
; instead of receiving grains, they reactivated local, basic grain production in 1991 
and utilized methods for economic growth and local, private sector development other than ODA 
and various IFI economic programs.
175 
 
In understanding that low-income countries are more likely to engage in civil war, 
significant research has addressed the importance of development and aid in preventing 
conflict.
176 
However, post-conflict aid dependency brings about another set of challenges for 
transitioning societies (i.e. conditional aid arrangements, unsteady aid flows, imposition of 
                                                 
171 del Castillo (2011): 12. 
172 del Castillo (2011): 12. 
173 del Castillo (2011): 14. 
174 Food for peace programs 
175 del Castillo (2011): 14. 
176 Collier (2003) 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 WLKJES003 48 
 
donor’s agendas, corruption, lessen accountability to tax base, lessen government credibility, 
etc.). These negative externalities highlighted the failure of structural adjustment policies to 
acknowledge the importance of public sector engagement for growth in a post-conflict setting. 
The “Mozambique experience suggest[s] that it [is] important to undertake reform and 
restructuring at the same time and to get to know the nature of the post-war economy”.177 Such 
measures include building government capacity, data / knowledge and research, infrastructure 
and communication improvements, participation / reintegration of ex-combatants, emphasis on 
poverty alleviation and rural development in addition to private sector growth interventions. 
 
In addition to strong aid dependency, distributive issues impact the socio-economic 
progress of a post-conflict society. In spite of economic growth, Mozambique faces “worsening 
[of] poverty in rural areas and [possibility] of state capture,” in addition to a “predatory elite that 
robs banks and non-donor resources, smuggles and kills, and maintains a corrupt justice system. 
A symbiotic relationship has grown up between the Mozambican predatory elite and the donors 
to maintain the myth of the Mozambican success story”.178 These strong allegations and 
challenges can be addressed by government channeling of private sector development to curb 
reliance on foreign aid and harmful capital flows. In addition to promoting growth by addressing 
inequality and continually providing opportunities for development, Mozambique’s private 
sector can contribute to sustainable peace as well as the state’s credibility and capacity for 
reducing dependency.  
There is no easy remedy to address aid dependency, but the quantity of foreign capital 
flows and the form that it takes (i.e. development assistance or investment capital flows) should 
be monitored. Some scholars suggest that the timeline in which investment should surpass 
foreign aid is five years. Given the contextual realities of post-conflict countries, in the 
immediate aftermath of violence there will be high aid and little private investment. Once 
infrastructure and institutions are established (resulting from significant investment climate 
activities), then private investment can surpass aid as the economy ‘graduates’ from conflict.179 
Slow privatization, corruption, small markets, and a complex / poorly structured regulatory 
system can slow this transition and should be monitored by external actors. Additionally, the 
donor procurement often takes place internationally and does not benefit the local economy, 
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giving little incentive for local employment or production. In summary, the most appropriate 
approach to addressing legitimacy and capacity building in post-conflict countries is by 
challenging aid through government. This engages the aforementioned issues as well as 
problems of coordination, fragmentation, corruption, gaps in policy, and duplication of efforts.
180
 
Although there are fears of government corruption, challenging donor aid through the public 
sector is ideal because there is (1) more information on and visibility into aid channels within 
government budgets, (2) less fungibility of aid money pledged to different entities, and (3) 
greater transparency and accountability controls (of certain entities) to appropriately disburse 
funds to other groups or individuals.
181
 
Sequencing of Activities 
 
The effectiveness of private sector development in promoting both economic growth and 
sustainable peace is contingent on the manner of its implementation; of the upmost importance is 
the sequencing of capacity development, risk mitigation strategies, and donor coordination. 
Capacity development is the “gradual construction of enabling conditions for peaceful 
development”; this engages local governments, businesses, civil society actors, and the diaspora 
in establishing networks and inter-institutional working structures committed to common 
goals.
182
 Socio-political sensitivity requires inclusivity in a post-conflict setting, as does 
sustainable peace in order to react to cultural shift and for change management to take hold for 
the success of the post-conflict transition.
183 
This requires interventions based on existing 
economic resources, citizens’ basic needs, and the community’s historical comparative 
advantage; for example, utilization of local resources and inputs should produce products or 
services tailored to be inclusive of the general community.
184 
In a post-conflict setting, this can 
involve utilizing new business opportunities that emerged during the war economy including 
“migration of labor, new businesses [even if informal], the break-down of binding traditional 
market structures, and the opening of new markets, new technologies, and new investments” to 
assist the masses.
185
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Conflict sensitive programming in the private sector development framework must take 
into account the four different phases of conflict: end of fight; rehabilitation and restoration; 
reconstruction; development and transformation. The end of violence does not equal economic 
security as economic reconstruction activities still face significant risk. For example, there are 
problems of “micro insecurity, with armed inhabitants desensitized to violence, and high rates of 
robbery, [which can] discourage the acquisition of visible assets. Second, macro insecurity, the 
considerable risk that war will be resumed ... is particularly important [and] can be reflected in 
political instability…likely to discourage private investment…. A third type of risk is the fiscal 
shocks resulting from the war to peace transition”.186 Therefore, the economy may not be truly 
open and private sector actors must develop coping strategies to deal with existing commercial 
mechanisms of rebels, warlords, etc. in the immediate aftermath of conflict.
187 
To address this, 
sustainable private sector development requires a robust civil society and public sector to 
promote security and incentivize investment. While aid can facilitate infrastructure development 
and donors can provide guarantees, governments and local actors must improve the investment 
climate and regulations to encourage sustain capital flow.  
The sequencing of activities in all phases of conflict transition and the division of 
appropriate roles and responsibly for various stakeholders is paramount. During the restoration 
and rehabilitation phase, conflict-sensitive sequencing of private sector development should 
consider implementation of Defense, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) strategies with 
ex-combatants to address grievances, provide economic incentives for peace, and to promote 
social capital development as discussed in previous chapters. At this time, there is a “need [to] 
balance demands for greater economic growth with those for greater social justice and human 
welfare. A series of changes and promises to deal with grievances are likely to have been agreed 
and to underpin any peace deal. To ignore these and to impose generic policies for economic 
growth that may have high short run costs may well simply lead to a reigniting of hostilities”.188 
At the same time, transitional justice mechanisms addressing social justice may be costly and 
their prioritization a risk to economic reconstruction and future growth. Therefore a window of 
opportunity exist for a “systematic integration of PSD measures as first generation reforms in the 
immediate post-conflict reconstruction agenda [are] an essential foundation for sustainable 
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economic development, … addressing short-term economic needs and supporting [the] peace 
building processes wherever feasible”.189 DCED suggest three approaches concerning conflict 
sensitivity that go above and beyond the ‘Do No Harm’ principle, (1) working around conflict 
(viewing conflict as an impediment / negative externality to avoid), (2) working in conflict (do 
no harm; minimizing risk), and (3) working on conflict (“conscious[ly] attempt[ing] to design 
policy and programs with a primary focus on conflict prevention, management, or 
resolution”).190 The last, active form of working on conflict allows implementation of economic 
programs that create peace-added-value such as conflict-sensitive private sector development.  
In 2009, USAID’s research discussed the challenges and best practices regarding 
implementation of investment climate reform. Although written for the purposes of development 
professionals from donor countries, many of these lessons are applicable to all parties. Firstly, 
USAID notes the importance of relationships that can be understood t  promote to building of 
social capital and trust. Managing expectations, improving security, building capacity of local 
partners, engaging various actors to avoid favoritism or hostility (including possible spoilers, 
women, diaspora community, etc.), and acknowledging that reform is not prioritized by all are 
factors for consideration during implementation of any post-conflict agenda. Additionally, while 
the best design of economic intervention activities utilizes a context-specific approach, there are 
significant costs and challenges to acquiring accurate and useful data from national accounts, 
firm-level surveys, household income surveys, expenditure surveys, and qualitative data from 
private and public sectors of post-conflict countries. If the data is even available, these 
undertakings often require external funding and their prioritization must be weighed against 
other vital needs of reconstruction states. In addition to brain drain of skilled workers, post-
conflict environments face extensive damage to buildings and institutions, leaving the country 
with little or no data or data collection capacity.
191 
Acknowledging these limitations, it is best to 
collect data in the immediate aftermath of a conflict to best contribute to post-conflict 
reconstruction when feasible. 
Implementation of private sector development must balance short and long terms goals, 
acknowledging the trade-offs of interventionists and investment climate strategies. Given the 
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post-conflict contextual realities, building parallel governance structures in the immediate 
aftermath of violence may be necessary; however, in the long run, it may prove problematic to 
replace indigenous structures or take away from local governance capacity. Accordingly, the 
preference is for private sector development to utilize existing institutions instead of creating 
artificial structures when avoidable.
 
Another example of this is the short-term desire to create 
jobs utilizing the informal economy, but decision makers must consider the sustainability of 
economic growth given future regulatory reforms. Lastly, the importance of asset building in a 
post-conflict environment requires “diverting some resources to build outriggers – peace-
building investments, recreation of the social contract, and reconstruction of the framework 
conditions that [underlie] social stability”.192 This diversion of resources could be utilized for 
other pro-poor activities; governments and donors must weigh these and other tradeoffs in their 
desires to achieve both short-term and long-term private sector development goals while building 
political credibility and the capacity to implement future, sustainable policy reform. 
 
Coordination of Actors  
 
In light of challenges with aid dependency and distributive issues, economic development 
in post-conflict developing countries requires external assistance. The private sector paradigm 
supports the emerging trend to seek investment for economic development as opposed to 
dependency on unpredictable aid cycles for sustainable growth. That being said, while African 
countries should play the primary role in economic development, realistic imbalances in today’s 
economy necessitate that the international community address inequalities in trade and eliminate 
distorting subsidies in industries like agriculture to stimulate growth.
193
 For example, the G20 
can address trade and infrastructure to assist business-led growth by encouraging an end to 
protectionist measures, reducing tariffs, and national subsidies.
194
  In 1998, Soludo illustrated the 
need for trade reforms coupled with enhanced capacity to take advantage of opportunities for 
economic growth. Previous attempts at trade globalization and labor intensive exports had failed 
to level the playing field because of limited investment in skills and capacity. This provides an 
opportunity for donors to build the capacity of the population and invest in training of skill 
laborers.  
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Numerous actors with varying agendas for growth often saturate post-conflict 
environments. Figure 4.2
195
 highlights the importance of the integration of all three sectors of 
society for pro-poor growth. Additionally, international private sector entities and donors must 
display flexibility and facilitate coordination among themselves and with local actors to share 
information concerning deployment of staff, assessments and monitoring of results, and 
programming to prevent duplication of efforts.
196 
These intentional labors will provide mutually 
beneficial for all involved specifically as it concerns research, policy advice, multi-donor finance 
mechanisms, and dialogue across the different sectors of local society to produce the best 
opportunities for growth and sustainable peace. Communication and education / socialization 
among other actors of activities, challenges, and best practices are vital to success of all 
concerned.  
Figure 4.2 
 
 
Post-conflict reconstruction requires coordination and cooperation of various actors from 
the public, private, and civil sectors of society. In analyzing private sector development and 
economic growth, the “commercial society drives it … political [government] society provides 
framework conditions to direct and manage it, and … civil society checks on the quality of the 
economy, for instance through insistence on subjecting growth to environment objectives or by 
demands for equitable growth”.197 Accordingly, there are best practices for collaboration among 
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the various actors including the state, local private sector, donor countries, MNCs, local armed 
groups, diaspora, regional actors, military, civil society organizations, and NGOs. Each actor can 
utilize different tools for reconstruction; for example, civil society organizations can contribute 
local knowledge and take ownership of building social capital; the local informal economy can 
provide jobs to stimulate growth; MNCs can input capital and create jobs with infrastructure 
projects; ex-combatants can contribute to the labor force; NGOs can train workers; and donor 
countries can provide conflict-sensitive foreign assistance. It is important to establish 
communication and coordination mechanisms to prevent duplicate of efforts, exacerbation of 
tensions, and to account for weakness in any given sector – for example the limited capacity of 
government in post-conflict settings can be compensated for by a robust civil society and 
enforcement of community rule of law.  
External actors must acknowledge that “the priorities can only be set in the local context 
by analyzing the extent to which growth is pro-poor … whether the factors that constitute an 
enabling environment for private sector development … are in place, whether the pattern of 
growth resulting from them offers opportunities for the poor, whether outcomes in important 
markets are pro-poor, and the extent to which risk aversion and poverty traps exclude the poor. 
The priorities must also take account of current political settlements and the level of resistance to 
change”; most of these factors have been described or alluded to throughout this paper.198 This 
may require the use of expensive assessments and diagnostic tools to analyze geographic, sector, 
institutional, and beneficiary terms of growth; the determination to utilize these tools
199
 is similar 
to that of the justice – development economic tradeoffs discussed previously. Regardless of 
mechanism utilized, it is important to analyze the local context and effectively communicate the 
realities; how the private sector perceives opportunities, risks, and constraints influences its 
participation in and manner of development.
200 
Continued monitoring and participatory learning, 
with feedback loops between stakeholders, impact development inputs to shape successful 
outcomes.
201 
 
Effective knowledge sharing and donor coordination of actors can assist multi-level 
interventions in complex environments and addresses short, medium, and long-term needs of 
post-conflict societies. As it concerns private sector development, the preference for investment 
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climate over interventionist priorities must be deliberated between various actors for a 
comprehensive and effective approach. The engagement of government with external actors and 
the local private sector is paramount in building the governance capacity of post-conflict states; 
specifically, private-public partnerships are a vital means by which to achieve economic growth 
and sustainable peace. Private-public partnerships for service provision can meet the needs of the 
people and facilitate private sector growth while also strengthening government legitimacy. Even 
in the absence of robust state capacity, it is important to preserve public trust; to this end, 
private-public partnerships at the very least give the state practice control or symbolic authority 
over private sector service provision.
202 
Donor partnerships with the state can also contribute to 
its legitimacy and capacity building, ultimately resulting in more sustainable development and 
prevention of a relapse of conflict; donors can (1) serve as a guarantor by assuming risks and 
guaranteeing security for loans, (2) protect the interest of the state, (3) reserve regulatory and 
licensing powers, or (4) establish timelines for private sector provision of services among other 
functions.
203 
Even with this assistance, there remains a challenge to ensure transparency and open 
communication among actors to prevent duplication of roles and responsibilities; limited 
cooperation may result from residual hostilities and a lack of trust after conflict.
204
 Additionally, 
post-conflict governments must also be mindful of blurred lines between the public and private 
sectors, as seen with public officials who control private companies or military leaders who 
control resource access. These legacies of the conflict economic must be dealt with accordingly 
and monopolies’ over-access to resources must be replaced with free and open competition and 
access to economic opportunities. External actors can participate in monitoring such progress to 
ensure that the population benefits from economic growth; these actors must remain mindful not 
to appear as bias interventionists or as predatory of a country’s wealth.  
In addition to public-private partnerships, donors can encourage engagement with local 
NGOs and CSOs to build social trust in post-conflict environments as previously discussed. 
These actors have a diversified and in-depth understanding of the context and may help prevent 
the appearance that external actors are ‘taking sides’ in intervention or development assistance. 
Depending on the timing of post-conflict reconstruction, these groups may have previously 
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“act[ed] as alternative social institutions in the absence of an effective or trustworthy state”.205 
Therefore, government engagement of these entities further promotes government credibility and 
legitimacy in the eyes of the people. Humanitarian relief groups and external NGOs should also 
coordinate with these groups and local private sector actors to facilitate integrated relief 
programming in the aftermath of a conflict or during periods that necessitate emergency 
response. These efforts can address distributive issues and potential market distortions resulting 
from a failure to implement conflict-sensitive and context-specific private sector development. 
The UN World Food Programme’s Purchase for Progress (P4P) program, operational in 
Mozambique, is an example of such inclusive efforts that engage various stakeholders. This 
program addresses local procurement of food, cooperative engagement, and stability for 
investment. Local business associations have direct interest in private sector development; 
therefore, their coordination with NGOs and CSOs to best meet the needs of citizens helps 
facilitate pro-poor growth. Often these entities “can be very dynamic and flexible, but may have 
trouble scaling up or making their businesses sustainable in the long-term” necessitating external 
assistance; accordingly, early coordinator with other actors may improve opportunities for 
success.
206
 
Multi-national corporations (MNCs) have a critical role to play in post-conflict 
reconstruction and private sector development. As discussed in Chapter One, the importance of 
conflict sensitivity is paramount and should exceed the ‘Do No Harm’ principle to actively work 
on conflict assisting with capacity building of local institutions (both private and public) to 
ensure sustainable peace. MNCs that operate in a conflict environment, and perhaps previously 
contributed to the war economy, at the very least provide employment opportunities, business 
linkages, and may also provide information about local knowledge assessment to benefit other 
actors such as NGOs who have limited resources to conduct similar analysis. Post-conflict 
environments often provide an unsaturated market with a large labor force, ideal for large MNCs 
willing to take the risk. That being said, MNCs should be integrated within the wider economy 
[or else] they will not contribute to broad-based economic growth, and [instead] introduce[e] a 
parallel economy in an already-destabilized country…add[ing] to fragility. Such an arrangement 
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may also attract skilled laborers away from the mainstream economy, and create inequalities 
which may form the basis for future resentment and conflict”.207  
By highlighting the failure of previous paradigms to positively build up the public sector, 
the private sector development paradigm heavily emphasizes the importance of all three sectors 
of domestic society. Additionally, partnership with international actors and coordination of 
activities is critical to preventing a relapse in violence by ensuring that underlying causes, 
especially grievances of specific populations, are addressed. The knowledge transfer between 
actors and partnership in development activities further builds social capital and forces 
integration of individuals for economic productivity and sustainable peace.  
Conclusion 
This paper highlights the unique needs of post-conflict countries when it comes to the 
promotion of economies development and sustainable peace. In analyzing various economic 
development paradigms, the arguments presented here are in favor of the private sector 
development framework as the leading practices to be implemented. This framework and 
respective activities acknowledge the uniqueness of a post-war economy: 
 
When wars end, countries confront a multi-pronged transition. Violence must give way to 
security for inhabitants; lawlessness and political exclusion must give way to the rule of 
law and participatory government; ethnic, religious, or class / caste polarization must give 
way to national reconciliation; and ruined war economies must be transformed into 
functioning market economies that enable ordinary people to support themselves….These 
multiple tasks make economic reconstruction fundamentally different from ‘development 
as usual’.208 
 
After providing an understanding of the relationship between economics and conflict, Chapter 
Two outlined how the international financial institutions have pushed ‘development as usual’ 
agendas of liberalization, competition, open markets, and minimum government tax and 
expenditures; however, post-conflict development faces “issues concerning urban versus rural 
development, health, education, and personal security, women, youth, the elderly, and other 
vulnerable populations”.209 These approaches failed to help build the sustainability of new 
governments in post-conflict countries and instance had three major negative impacts on 
government legitimacy resulting from their implementation: (1) prevention of flexibility in 
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printing money for peace-related programs and emergencies; (2) lack of government control over 
donor priories in challenging aid; and (3) challenges in generating tax revenue for service 
provision to address inequality and other grievances.
210
 These examples and those illustrated in 
Chapter Two highlight the need for post-conflict private sector development to be distinguished 
from broader economic development activities given that the objectives for the former are two-
fold in promotion of both peace and economic growth.  
The private sector development framework, described in Chapter Three, shed light onto 
the importance of reconciling economic development policies with post-conflict challenges 
including DDR, rehabilitation of services, or development of infrastructure. Rebuilding a post-
conflict society demands national ownership, capacity, and ingenuity.
211 
Accordingly, domestic 
policy decisions in post-conflict environments must take into consideration the need to balance 
long-term goals with the importance of adopting emergency policies, the instability of aid flows, 
the possibility of corruption and elite exploitation of resource wealth.
212
 Accordingly, the 
engagement of all three sectors of domestic society and external actors are vital to the 
reconstruction process. 
 
Chapters Three and Four focus on how achievement of sustainable peace requires 
economic reform that addresses underlying and precipitating factors of conflict which include 
social distrust and lack of / unequal economic opportunities. Accordingly, distributive issues and 
aid dependency are unsustainable and can cause a reigniting of hostilities. It is of upmost 
importance to design incentives in such a way that is within the capacity of a young government. 
This requires participation of public, private, and civil society actors. For example, this paper has 
highlighted how providing citizens with the ability to earn incomes and productively contribute 
to society can mitigate incentives for violence, demonstrating how economic development and 
the pursuit of growth can contribute to peace even at the community level. As stated previously, 
in understanding that trust is of economic value,
213
 adequate post-conflict economic 
reconstruction programs must address not only good governance and institutional reform but also 
the rebuilding of trust.  
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The analysis of historical economic development paradigms implemented in post-conflict 
countries and their failures illustrate the need to understanding the role of economic inequality in 
incentivizing violence and hindering sustained governance and growth. The pro-poor growth and 
poverty reduction strategies of the late 1990s and early 2000s began to address these concerns; 
these approaches emphasized the role of institutions in sustaining growth, but still failed to set 
benchmarks for private sector development or monitor outcomes for the private and civil society 
sectors.
214
 The private sector development framework acknowledges the importance of 
governance in both growth and sustainable peace. Although written in reference to resource 
wars, the statements of Le Billion in suggesting that the “likelihood of violent conflict decreases 
as human capital develops (e.g. through education, trading, and manufacturing skills), the 
economy diversifies, and governance becomes more representative and accountable” are relevant 
to development in a broader context.
215
 Accordingly, if it is the corruption of the state and 
inability to secure resources and livelihoods for their citizens that exacerbates conflict, then 
building the capacity of state institutions should be prioritized to prevent or mitigate conflict. 
The final chapter of this paper has engaged dialogue about criticism and challenges of the private 
sector development approach; specifically as it concerns aid dependency, coordination of actors, 
and challenges in sequencing of actors. While a step in the right direction, this approach must 
been further refined and will require continued adaptation as public officials, business owners, 
scholars, development professionals, and others begin to implement these policies in the future 
post-conflict countries of Iraq, Afghanistan, South Sudan, Libya, etc. 
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